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Recent decisions' invoking Section 90 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts demonstrate that the doctrine of promissory estoppel embodied
in that section 2 is playing an important role in the fixing of limits of
contractual responsibility. Promissory estoppel is, however, today serv-
ing functions quite different from those contemplated by the draftsmen
of Section 90. The principal application of the doctrine is no longer in
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1. This article is concerned primarily with decisions rendered during the coursM of the
past ten years. For discussions of earlier collections of promissory estoppel cases, see
Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ? 35 Mic. L. REv. 908 (1937); Boyer, Promis.
sory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents, 50 MAIcr. L. REv. 639, 873 (1952); Annot., 48
A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956); 22 MINN. L. REv. 843 (1939); Note, The Measure of Damages for
Breach of a Contract Created by Action in Reliance, 48 YA.n L.J. 1036 (1939).
2. REsTATMENT OF CoNTrAcrs § 90 (1932) provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and ,hich
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise.
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts proposes that Section 90
be altered to read as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONT crs § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
Because the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the rules of Section 90 are customarily
understood to refer to the same general theory of reliance, they will be used interchange.
ably in this discussion. The objections to using the phrase "promissory estoppel" to
describe the doctrine of enforceability because of action in reliance are noted in IA
A. CoQR¢i, ComRAcrs § 204 (rev. ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Cowmm].
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the limited area of gratuitous promises, 3 but in the much broader field
of bargain transactions. A number of earlier cases, to be sure, did apply
promissory estoppel to gratuitous promises made in a business setting.
But both courts and commentators understood that the basis of enforce-
ment was that the promisor had failed to prescribe a return for his
promise. 4 Indeed, the basic elements of promissory estoppel doctrine
have been fashioned in the context of the explicit assumption that the
doctrine properly operates outside the bargain relationship.
The usual setting out of which a Section 90 promise currently
emerges, however, is commercial, not benevolent. More important, the
promise which calls for application of Section 90 is typically one which
contemplates an exchange.5 Section 90 has thus grown from a device
for enforcing certain gratuitous promises into a useful, though little
understood, contract tool for recognizing the reliance element in bar-
gain transactions as well.
Expanded application of any legal doctrine naturally raises questions
about practical consequences and effective limits. With respect to Sec-
tion 90, the implications of expansion are to be found in the manner
in which theories of reliance upon promises are shaping the evolution
and application of other principles to which our system of contract has
traditionally been committed, particularly the "bargain principle" of
consideration and the "assent principle"7 of offer-acceptance. The pur-
pose of this discussion is to examine the extent to which familiar rules
of contract formation, validation and adjustment have been affected
by, and have themselves shaped the course of, expanded use of the
promissory estoppel concept of Section 90.
3. The term "gratuitous promise" traditionally refers to a promise which Is not con-
ditioned on a specified return-i.e., a promise of a gift. The tendency has been to extend
the meaning of the term to include all promises found by the courts to be unsupported
by consideration, whether or not the promise in fact asked for a consideration.
4. That a gift promise is essential to the theory of promissory estoppel is conclusively
established by the earlier literature. See, e.g., Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements
and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1950).
5. According to common law dogma, a promise which by its terms is conditional upon
a return promise or performance is an "offer." RESTATixNT Or CONTRACTS § 24 (1932).
In addition to promises which are operative as offers, Section 90 is being applied to
promises which propose an exchange, but which fail to satisfy the requirements of an offer.
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 75 (1932), states the traditional definition of bargain
consideration:
Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
(d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
7. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 20-22 (1932):
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal contract is essential
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II. Tensions Between the Reliance Principle and the
Bargain Principle
Injury to the person or property of one who justifiably relied on the
undertaking of another was apparently the earliest basis upon which
informal contracts were enforced in the action of assumpsit 8 And re-
liance, whether actual or probable, was an essential ingredient in the
evolutionary process through which consideration doctrine developed
as the keystone of traditional contract law.9 But despite the early promi-
nence of the element of reasonable reliance in contract, the require-
ment of "bargain" or "exchange," apparently an extension of the idea
of quid pro quo in the action of debt,10 has emerged as the core of
consideration doctrine. The classifications of responsibility which we
have come to regard as conventional, and which have been accorded
blackletter status in the Restatement of Contracts, evidence a preoccu-
pation with the belief that only promises for which some agreed price
has been paid are deserving of enforcement. Thus, according to the
catechism of consideration, action in reliance upon a promise is suffi-
cient reason for enforcement only when the action is bargained for by
the promisor and given in return by the promisee."
The proceedings leading to the drafting of Section 90, on the other
hand, evidence concern solely with justifiable detrimental reliance on
promises for which no agreed equivalent has been asked or tendered.12
The sections of the Restatement which deal specifically with action in
reliance out of an agreed exchange1 3 confirm that the rules of Section 90
have independent force without regard to, and in spite of, the bargain
to its formation and the acts by which such assent is manifested must be done with
the intent to do those acts; ... [§ 20]
The manifestation of mutual assent may be made wholly or partly by written or
spoken words or by other acts or conduct. [§ 21]
The manifestation of mutual assent almost invariably takes the fonn of an offer
or proposal by one party accepted by the other part) or parties. [§ 2218. See generally Ames, The History of Assurnpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53 (1888); Holds-Worth, The Modern History of the Doctrine of Consideration, 2 BosroN U.L REV. 87, 17.1(1922).
9. The force of the reliance factor in the half-completed and executor) exchanges isdiscussed in Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUMr. L. REV. 799, 806-12 (1941).10. For summaries of the historical basis of the action of debt, as well as assumpsit.
see 1 CopBIN § 117; 1 S. WILLMsON, CoNTRAcrs § 99 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter dited as
WILMsON].
11. As to the requirement that the promise induce the conduct of the promisee, andthe conduct of the latter induce the making of the promise, see the opinion of Mr. JusticeHolmes in Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903).12. RESrATEMENT OF ComrraAcrs, Commentaries § 88 [§ 90], comment e at 19 (Tent.Draft No. 2, 1926): ". . . but the cases in question are not cases of bargains; they aregratuitous promises on which justifiable reliance has been placed."
13. REsTA'1"EmNr OF ComRAcrs §§ 45, 75 (1932).
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concept. In shoit, Section 90 states the proposition that, in situations
where traditional consideration is lacking, reliance which is foreseeable,
reasonable, and serious will require enforcement if injustice cannot
otherwise be avoided.
In practice, however, the fate of a promisee who urges the theory of
"unbargained-for"14 reliance does not rest solely upon application of
the specific requirements of Section 90. On the contrary, experience
demonstrates that his case may realiy turn on the ability of the court
to reconcile the reliance factor implicit in promissory estoppel with a
general theory of consideration which is dominated by notions of
reciprocity, yet concedes that "some informal promises are enforceable
without the element of bargain."'u
It is indeed a curious development that the attempt to establish, in
Section 90, a separate identity for the reliance principle of promissory
estoppel should not have achieved greater success. Part of the difficulty
lies in the fact that the reliance principle, in many respects, operates
against the thrust of conventional teachings. The essential function of
consideration is to determine the types of promises which should not
be enforced. The promise which does not purport to exact an exchange
is singled out by consideration doctrine as the one least worthy of en-
forcement, because it may well have been given without the care which
an exchange relationship encourages and because it is least likely to
serve a useful economic function. The disfavor with which the gratui-
tous promise is viewed by orthodox doctrine naturally militates against
open judicial recognition that binding obligations can arise from reli-
ance upon gift promises.'
Furthermore, precisely because we have established the bargaining
process as the prime indicator of the value of promises, institutional
pressures are at work to bring the reliance principle of proinissory
14. The phrase is usually attributed to Professor Fuller. See L. FtJLZiRt & R. BI3fAUC11EIt,
BAsic CoNrRAar LAw 202-03 (1964).
15. R.SrATEMENT OF CONTRACts § 75, comment c at 81 (1932).
16. It has been observed that once the element of exchange is removed from a transac-
tion, " . . the appeal to judicial intervention decreases both in terms of form and
substance." Fuller, supra note 9, at 819. That hardened common law attitudes toward
the gratuitous promise have influenced the handling of the reliance factor is illustrated
by the following language from Stonestreet v. Southern Oil Co., 226 N.C. 261, 263, 87
S.E .2d 676, 677 (1946): ". . . when one receives a naked promise and such promise Is not
kept, he is no worse off than he was before the promise was made. He gave nothing for
it, loses nothing by it, and upon its breach he suffers no recoverable damage." Cf. Jones
v. Vulcan Materials Co., 112 Ga. App. 402, 145 S.E.2d 263, 272 (1965). See also Conmnon-
wealth v. Scituate Say. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884) (Holmes, J.): "It would cut tip the
doctrine of consideration by the roots if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise
binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it."
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estoppel within that process. Judges accustomed to defining value in
terms of exchange, when faced with problems of non-exchange, might
well be expected to remove themselves to familiar ground. Since most
promises coming to the courts for enforcement involve an element of
exchange, actual or contrived, the bargain theory of consideration dis-
poses of the typical case with ease. The smoothness with which it func-
tions most of the time is no doubt due to the high degree to which it
conforms with the pattern of exchange which permeates social and
business relations.17 It is thus not surprising that judges tend to think
in bargain terms, and to try to assimilate reliance theory to more fa-
miliar principles applicable to the normal bargain situation. Such ten-
dencies are particularly understandable in light of the presence of reli-
ance elements in many bargain situations falling dearly within the
ambit of standard principles of consideration. It is easy to forget that
while reliance may in some instances be essential to bargain theory,"'
bargain is not essential to reliance theory. Though it typically accom-
panies bargain transactions,.' conduct in reliance occurs in a variety of
forms and degrees and may well be induced independent of the mak-
ing of a bargain. The factual element of reliance cuts across bargain
lines, and may, in the absence of bargain, serve as a separate basis for
imposing contract obligations. But the fact that reliance coincides with
bargain in some cases tends to pull it within the classification in all
cases.
20
Thus the importance of bargain in practical affairs, reinforced by the
17. See generally Patterson, An Apology For Consideration, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 929
(1958).
18. Where, for example, the bargain is for a return performance rather than a promise.
19. "Certainly reliance is one of the main bases for enforcement of the half-completed
exchange, and the probability of reliance lends support to the enforcement of the execu-
tory exchange." RsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNmAcrs § 90, comment a at 165 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1965).
20. Some fairly mechanical factors may also have the effect of concealing the signifi-
cance of reliance as a distinct basis of liability. For example, the structuring of Section 90
as an exception to orthodox theory may have slowed its acceptance because of the intima-
tion that promissory estoppel is not for general application, but must be reserved for
weighty and uncommon circumstances. If a court accords only narrow recognition to
Section 90, frequently it will emphasize that promissory estoppel is an exception to well-
established doctrine. See, e.g., Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., 172
So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). That Section 90 is dram from cases which
represent a variety of exceptions to conventional doctrine also tends to make the courts
cautious in extending it to cases not within the established exceptions. Further, the
requirement that a court first determine the fact of bargain must surely influence the
approach made to a given sequence of events. Even if the ement of bargain is found
not to exist, the weight accorded specific facts in the search for bargain can be expected
to carry over to other grounds of enforcement. An orientation to first exhaust the pos-
sibilities of bargain might well cushion the impact of events removed in time or space
from the moment of the making of the promise, such as subsequent dealings initiated
by the promisee with third persons, or the abandonment of such possibilities on the as-
sumption the promise will be honored.
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priority accorded it in law, has made it difficult for courts to isolate the
reliance problem and to handle it with consistency. The notion that
bargain represents a calculated effort by the promisor to satisfy some
desire, usually economic, operates to make the conduct of the promisee
of secondary importance. Because of the prevailing policy that the
element of bargain, standing alone, justifies enforcement, action in
reliance is commonly seen as a tool for sorting out motives which bear
on the issue of exchange.21 The fact that the promisee may have in-
curred expense, or otherwise have relied to his detriment, is subsumed
in considerations about whether the promisor, in accordance with the
rules of offer and acceptance, has received the particular advantage
which prompted his promise. Reliance, under this approach, functions
not as a substantive ground for enforcement, but as a vehicle for identi-
fication of some other ground for enforcement.
22
Moreover, the disposition to treat action in reliance as proof of bar-
gain rather than as an independent basis of enforcement most seriously
impairs the reliance principle in the very cases in which reliance is
likely to be the only available ground for relief. Because the cases which
most clearly warrant the application of Section 90 seldom involve re-
liance which is beneficial to the promisor, a causal relation between
putative bargain and factual reliance is likely to be difficult to find.
" '
The risk that action in reliance will be found to be not sufficiently
serious to justify application of Section 90, or to be merely a condition
of a gratuitous promise, is thereby increased.2 4 In addition, in the ab-
sence of benefit conferred, the enrichment factor is not available to
give color to reliance or to support relief along restitutionary lines.
21. Williston's discussion of his celebrated tramp case suggests the role of reliance as an
aid to interpretation of arguable bargain promises. See I WILLISTON § 112. Moreover, If a
promisee has clearly been hurt by reasonable action in reliance, to require that a price
of the injury must be shown is to confess that the injury itself is not of critical importance.
22. Many of the consideration cases use Section 90 to identify the benefit or detriment
branches of consideration theory. E.g., Pike v. Triska, 165 Neb. 104, 84 N.W.2d 311 (1957);
Leach v. Treber, 164 Neb. 419, 82 N.W.2d 544 (1957); Jackson v. Kemp, 211 Tenn. 438,
365 S.W.2d 437 (1963). Section 90 has also been used to mark off a doubtful offer. Jaybe
Construction Co. v. Beco, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 406, 216 A.2d 208 (1965). In -essler, Inc.
v. Farrell, 226 A.2d 708 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1967), the issue of whether the payment of retire-
ment benefits to a former employee constituted an illegal gift of corporate assets was
resolved by resort to the reliance principle of promissory estoppel.
23. The difficulties with the bargain concept in connection with expensive reliance
prior to acceptance are well-documented. E.g., Prather v. Vasquez, 162 Cal. App. 2d 198
(1958); Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Co., 22 N.J. 523, 126 A.2d 646 (1956); American Hand-
kerchief Corp. v. Frannat Realty Co., 17 N.J. 12, 109 A.2d 793 (1954). Cf. Wright v. United
States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616 (D. Ore. 1967); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 86
Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
24. See Overlock v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 126 Vt. 549, 237 A.2d 856 (1967);
Fedun v. Mike's Cafe, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 356, 204 A.2d 776 (1964), aff'd, 419 Pa. 607,
213 A.2d 638 (1965).
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Not even the preference of the courts for the detriment branch of
consideration has diminished the appeal of bargain as the prevailing
context of analysis and decision. Rather than freeing the reliance factor
of its subordinate status, the effect of broadening the meaning of detri-
ment to include practically any conduct of the promisee has been to
encourage a corresponding expansion of the bargain concept.25 This
development was predictable so long as the expansion of the concept of
detriment took place within a frame of reference which concentrated
attention upon events surrounding the making of the promise, rather
than upon the consequences of non-performance. It is now true that
conventional theory can be manipulated so as to protect even gratuitous
promises. But while the holdings in such cases may be approved, their
circuitous reasoning tends to confuse the law of reliance by converting
change of position in any form or degree into consideration.20 The
disposition of judges, adverted to above, to talk the language of familiar
doctrine adds to the pressure to fit the reliance principle of promissory
estoppel into the mold of consideration rules.27 Thus despite the Re-
statement directive that Section 90 promises are enforceable without
25. The reduction of consideration to detrimental conduct has been recognized as an
oversimplification which confuses the principal functions of the doctrine. Patterson, supra
note 17, at 932-34. The elasticity of current bargain concepts is illustrated in Dyer
v. Metallic Bldg. Co., 410 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The historical process whereby
content was given the idea of "detriment" in contract is noted in C. Fi'oor, HISToRY AND
SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW---ToRT AND CoNTRAcT 295 (1949). See generally F. KESSLER
& M. SHARP, CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 14-27 (1953).
26. Unless the requirement of bargain is dispensed with, the notion that any peron
suffering serious detrimental reliance has satisfied the elements of consideration is not
likely to receive consistent administration in the courts. E.g., compare Hessler, Inc.
v. Farrell, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 708 (1967), with Pitts v. McGraw.Edison Co., 329 F.2d 412
(6th Cir. 1964).
27. It should be noted that the appeal of reliance often pulls in a direction opposite
from that of bargain. Any bargained-for change of position, however slight or inexpensive.
is consideration, regardless of the factual impact of the case. On the other hand, an
unperformed promise which presents a compelling case for relief because of prejudicial
reliance cannot be enforced on consideration grounds unless the reliance constitutes an
equivalent given in exchange. Whether or not a court will use Section 90 as the ground
for relief in the latter case depends in part upon its understanding of the range of
choice provided by consideration theory. One escape route, charted by the dilution of
detriment, is to find in the reliance part performance of an offer of a unilateral contract.
E.g., Lehrer v. McCloskey Homes, Inc., 245 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1957); Associated Creditors'
Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610, 49 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966); In re Field's
Estate, 11 Misc. 2d 427, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sur. Ct. 1958). See Navin, Some Comments on
Unilateral Contracts and Restatement 90, 46 MARQ. L. Rrv. 162 (1962). If the reliance
cannot fairly be said to amount to part performance, but constitutes preparations leading
to performance, it may supply a basis for constructing a bilateral contract on the theory
of an implied return promise. Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67
P. 1086 (1902). See generally I CoRBIN §§ 51, 52, 144. A line of authority interpreting a
promise of a gift to support a bilateral contract is dealt with in Dunaway v. First Pr
byterian Church, - Ariz. -, 442 P.2d 93 (1968). Either of these conventional theories
may produce a satisfactory result. But the shortcomings of this kind of anal)sis are
obvious if the central problem in the case is reasonable reliance and the court is
persuaded that the reliance, by itself, justifies enforcement.
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consideration, the theme of consideration is in fact the point of de-
parture for nearly every judicial discussion of promissory estoppel.
Consequently, it is fashionable to portray the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as some kind of stand-in for consideration. 28 If promissory
estoppel cannot be extricated from the language and label of considera-
tion, the elements of Section 90 are likely to function as little more than
an extension of the criteria of the latter.
III. The Functions of Section 90 in the Bargaining Process
While the pressures discussed above have tended to assimilate Section
90 into the consideration-centered framework of traditional contract
law, blurring the outlines of reliance theory in the process, the domesti-
cation of the section has at the same time had the effect of expanding
the sphere of application accorded the theory of promissory estoppel by
the courts. Before discussing the details of this expansion, however, it is
worth considering briefly some of its general background and implica-
tions.
A. General Background
It must first be remembered that the tradition which produced
Sectior 90 necessitatec the pxtprction of a broad generalization from an
assortment of cases which are not reducible to a systematic pattern. 29
The oral promise of land, followed by entry and improvements, brings
into play a wide range of considerations, including the enrichment
factor, the history of equity, the Statute of Frauds, and property con-
cepts relating to the status of title.80 Policy considerations of a different
kind are responsible for the varied theories which have been used to
28. Thp talitipn of giving the term "consideration" broad enough coverage to include
th6'cases of action in reliance in the absence of bargain is noted in IA ConnIN §§ 193, 195.
4n interesting aspect of 'th6' modem promissory estoppel decisions is that there Is fre-
quentqyless reason to take 'issie' witti'the actual results than with the arguments by which
the court rrives af them. This may suggest that a kind of rough, ethical notion of the
reince prnciple' is widely accepted, though the mechanics of theory have not been
worked out.
29. "Th restaters ,wqce awatp that they were framing "a broader rule than has often
bF4n laid down?"'The "bin'ding threid of principle" they extracted from the various
catgohes of cases was "the justifiable rehazice of the promisee." RESTATEMENT OF
C6mtCars, Comnmentaries § 88 [§ 90], 14, 19-20 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1926). The standard
situatfons out of which the doFtrin 'of promissory estoppel evolved--charitable subscrip.
dons, parol promises to give land, and a miscellaneous group of gratuitous promises
involving bailments, agencies, and Waiver of existing rights-are analyzed in BoYrs, supra
note 4; SHATrUCK, supra note'l; 22 MINN. L. REV. 843 (1938); 48 YALE L.J. 1036 (1939).
30. Greiner v.' Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393
(1882). Cf. Page, Consideration: Genuine and Synthetic, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 483, 503.04(1947).
350
Val. 78: 343, 1969
.Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine
protect charitable subscriptions,31 and help explain why the ablest of
judges might strain conventional theory in order to enforce gift prom-
ises to charities.3 2 Tort analogies focusing upon consequential losses
have apparently influenced the treatment of the gratuitous bailee.33 At
the same time, the degree to which the estoppel idea is reinforced
by voluntary dealings or relationships of blood or family undoubtedly
accounts for the historical protection of a host of promises reliance
upon which gives rise to varying degrees of injustice.
Much current difficulty in working with the older cases stems from
inconsistencies and tensions within the groupings themselves. Not only
does the weight of a particular factor vary with the type of case, but the
std.ndard situations in which the courts have commonly granted relief
for reliance losses involve a number of factors which have no special
relevance outside a particular grouping of cases.34 In addition, these
citegories no longer represent the bulk of case activity under Section
90.35 Because they are principally concerned with the degree of reliance
necess-ry to make a gratuitous promise binding, they are frequently
inappropriate in the area of commercial transactions. Section 90 largely
overcomes these limitations by language which ignores factual patterns
and emphasizes the injustice of denying relief in any situation where
serious and foreseeable reliance is demonstrated. Nevertheless, the
31. See IA COaBIN § 198, for a discussion of the reasoiis commbnly given for ehforcing
charitable subscriptions. Because of the favored status of the chu;ritable institution, the
courts traditionally reflect the attitude that "we are not confined to the same orthodox
concepts which once were applicable to every situation arising within a commonl law
jurisdiction." Danby i. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 34 Del. Ch. 427, 104 A,2d 903. 907 (1954).
32. I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E.2d 532 (1938); Allegheny
College v. National Chautaugua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927). Cf.
Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church, - Ariz. -, 442 P.2d 93 (1968).
33. Eg., Siegal v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923). Contra, Comfort
v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268 N.Y.S. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1933). See generally Sharp, Pacta
Sunt Servanda, 41 CoLum. L. Ray. 783, 790-92 (1941); Seavey, Relance Upon Gratuitous
Promises Or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951).
84. In addition, it has long been recognized that tile extent of actionable reliance
fluctuates in the various categories. For example, the probability of reliance often suffices
in the cases of marriage settlement and charitable subscription, as well as in some of the
waiver cases. On the other hand, such matters as gratuitous options usually require a
showing of substantial reliance. See, e.g., Wilson v. Spry, 145 Ark. 21, 203 S.W. 564 (1920);
Bird v. Kent, 19 Cal. 2d 449, 122 P.2d 8 (1942); Corbett v. Cronkhite, 239 Ill. 9, 87 N.E.
874 (1909); Kucera v. Kavan, 165 Neb. 131, 84 N.W.2d 207 (1957); Langer v. Superior
Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A. 571 (1932), rev'd on other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178
A. 490 (1935).
85. Apit from the waiver category, onlk a few decisions falling within the well.known
promissory estoppel groupings have appeared in the reports duting the last ten years.
See, e.g., Hebrew Univ. Ass'n v. Ny6, 26 Conn. Supp. 842, 223 A.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
(gift promise to charitable institution); Canterbury Stores, Inc. v. Canterbury At Arlington,
43 N.J. 256, 203 A.2d 713 (1964) (gratuitous license); East Providence Credit Union v.
Geremia, - R.I. , 239 A.2d 725 (1968) (promise to procure insurance). Cf. Prevas v.
Gottlieb, 229 Aid. 188, 182 A.2d 489 (1962); Rouse v. Roy L. Houck Son's Corp., - Ore.
-, 439 P.2d 856 (1968); Hagan v. Turner, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (1963).
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formulation of a doctrine sufficiently broad to cover the entire land-
scape of promises involves obvious risks. The broader the scope of the
doctrine, the less orderly the process of application is bound to be.30
It has been noted above that on practically every occasion on which
the courts have dealt explicitly with Section 90 in recent years, the
promise in question has been made either in contemplation of a com-
mercial return or in the course of commercial negotiations. 37 Expanded
notions of bargain, perhaps prompted by the problems of the mixed
gift, provide only a limited explanation for the scarcity of gift promises
arising under Section 90. It may be that the promise of a gift is no
longer of much practical significance. But if bargain theory has altered
the commonly understood role of promissory estoppel, the question
arises whether the incentives for enforcement of the purely gratuitous
promise are not on the wane.3 8 And if the gratuitous promise is no
longer relevant to the theory of Section 90, policy considerations de-
veloped in relation to the conventional idea of promissory estoppel will
have to be carefully examined before Section 90 is made a vehicle for
relieving injustices occasioned by business bargains.
The most obvious consequence of the application of Section 90 in
areas other than that of the gratuitous promise is that the distinguish-
ing characteristics of conventional theories are obscured. It is standard
practice in a good many jurisdictions to plead the theory of considera-
tion simultaneously with that of promissory estoppel, urging the same
allegations and evidence in support of both theories. Occasionally, it
is true, the facts of a given case lend themselves to analysis under either
approach.39 But although the use of alernative theories by a litigant is
36. The mere breadth of statement of Section 90 gives the impression that the objective
is to declare a legal effect without regard to specific meanings. Consequently, the develop-
ment of criteria for determining whether a promise ought to be enforced is likely to be
heavily shaped by familiar doctrine.
37. The author has uncovered more than 100 decisions during the period in question
in which promissory estoppel was considered as the ground of decision in a clear bargain
transaction. In more than one-third of those cases, the theory of Section 90 was used as
the sole or alternative basis for enforcement.
38. There is some evidence in the cases that we have in fact come full circle, and that
a finding that a promise is a mere gratuity operates to preclude enforcement under
Section 90. E.g., Fedun v. Mike's Cafe, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 356, 204 A.2d 776 (1964),
af0'd, 419 Pa. 607, 213 A.2d 638 (1965); Darmopray v. Bayeas, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 182 (C.l.
Montgomery County 1957). Cf., Kaufman v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 866 F.2d 326,
333 (3d Cir. 1966); Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). This atti-
tude is apparently an outgrowth of earlier admonitions against the "loose" application of
promissory estoppel for fear that "any promise, regardless of the complete absence of
consideration, would be enforceable." This language, apparently traceable to Stelmack
v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 339 Pa. 410, 14 A.2d 127, 129 (1940), has enjoyed wide circulation
in the cases.
39. Some courts have frankly acknowledged that they are able to read the record as
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entirely consistent with good practice, a large number of courts are
invoking both promissory estoppel and consideration doctrine in their
opinions without any recognition of differences in theory. 0 It can be
argued that obscuring the distinct criteria of the bargain and reliance
principles provides the courts with increased flexibility and ensures
wider enforcement of deserving promises. But judicial intertwining of
the two theories can cut the other way as well, preventing plaintiffs
from circumventing certain obstacles peculiar to one or the other
theory.41 For example, a plaintiff in a recent 'Wisconsin case 2 attempted
to proceed on the basis of promissory estoppel because of a fatal defect
in his case with respect to consideration theory. His lack of success
appears to have been partly due to the court's insistence that considera-
tion rules be taken into account.
43
The breadth of statement of Section 90 has facilitated movement of
reliance theory into the realm of bargain. Because of the flexibility
which results from the generalized phrasing of the doctrine, many
courts have apparently concluded that cases can be decided more easily
by the use of promissory estoppel than by consideration rules. 44 Thus,
promissory estoppel is currently an effective device for defeating a
motion to dismiss. 45 It is even more effective as a defense against a
motion for summary judgment.40 The preference for promissory estop-
warranting the application of either Section 90 or consideration doctrine. E.g., East
Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, - R.I. -, 239 A.2d 725 (1968).
40. See, e.g., Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co.. 239 Cal. App. 2d 610.
49 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966); City of Los Angeles v. Anchor Gas. Co.. 204 Cal. App. 2d 175. 22
Cal Rptr. 278 (1962); Nichols v. Acers Co., 415 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 197): Dyer
v. Metallic Bldg. Co., 410 SAV.2d 56 (Tex. Civ App. 1966).
41. Problems of proof and damages under the consideration label might well lead to
emphasis of Section 90. See, e.g., Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olymipian, Inc., - Wash. -,
443 P.2d 544 (1968). On the other hand, known difficulties in extending Section 90 to
certain types of cases may cause a litigant to turn to another theory. See pp. 384.S & notes
224-31 infra.
42. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 NA.2d 587 (1967). See also
Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Comment, Contracts-Perina.
nent Employment-Applicability of Doctrine of Pronissory Estoppel, 47 Iowa L REV.
725 (1962). Cf. p. 564 & note 109 infra.
43. 153 NA..2d at 590-91.
44. Eg., Glitsos v. Kadish, 4 Ariz. App. 134. 418 P.2d 129 (1966); Haveg Corp. v. Gu)er,
- Del. -, 226 A.2d 231 (1967); Anthony v. Hilo Elec. Light Co., - Hawaii -, 442 P.2d
64 (1968). In Schafer v. Fraser, 206 Ore. 446, 290 P.2d 190 (1955), the appellate court relied
solely on Section 90 to affin a judgment which the trial court had based on a theory of
bargain consideration.
45. Cf. e.g., Lehrer v. McCloskey Homes, Inc., 245 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1957); L S. Good
& Co. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 925 (ND. W. Va. 1968); Hilltop Properties
v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965). Contra, Wright v. U.S. RubberCo., 280 F. Supp. 616 (D. Ore. 1967); Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 12 Utah 2d 32. 404 P.d
30 (1965).
46. E.g., Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 196S).
The striking thing about many of the cases in which promissory estoppel is applied on
a summary judgment motion is that the case principally invohes a conventional .ontract
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pel, which exterids to dispositions on the merits as well, 47 may result
from the belief that a less detailed factual inquiry is required than
would be the case With consideration rules.48 The broad language of
Section 90 also enables courts to avoid struggling with the more unin-
telligible aspects of consideration doctrine, such as the so-called re-
quirement of "mutuality of obligation."
49
More important, the use of Section 90 avoids the necessity of unduly
stretching the concept of bargain in certain cases. Because of the re-
luctance of the common law to inquire into the adequacy of considera-
tion, it has been possible to manipulate the test of bargain so as to
extend protection to transactions in which the element of exchange is
not easily observed. 0 The opinions in such cases, however, disclose
some discomfort in the handling of conventional theory. The line
between bargain and gift is often vague, and an examination of the
motives of the parties may be less than conclusive.' Then, too, a court
may feel some reluctance to lend support to a contrived exchange
which is designed only to effect Ai gift.52 Further, the inclination to
reduce bargain to a "request '8 3 has confused the law in that it tends to
make the conditional gift look like an exchange. In light of these con-
ceptual and definitional problems, the appeal of Section 90 and its neat
criteria of promissory estoppel is understandable.
allegedly supported by bargain consideration, and the motion is argued on that theory.
Whorral v. Drewrys Ltd., 214 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Iowa 1963); Gill v. U.S. Rubber Co.,
195 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1961); Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 708 (1967);
Day v. Mtge. Insurance Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 428 P.2d 524 (1967); Bredemann v. Vaughan
Mfg. Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 232, 188 N.E.2d 746 (1963). Because the elements of a Section 90
claim are essentially factual, a summary judgment motion is an inappropriate occasion to
rule on them. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736, 739-40 (D.C. Cir.
1963); E. A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 78-79, 216
A.2d 246, 252-53 (1966).
47. E.g., Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1966).
48. In Veasey v. Layton, 42 Del. Ch. 155, 206 A.2d 505, 506 (1964), the court conceded
it had "not gone too much into the . . . case" because an uncontested promise had
occasioned reliance within the theory of promissory estoppel.
49. In Dunnan & Jeffrey, Inc. v. Gross Telecasting, Inc., 7 Mich. App. 113, 51 N.W.2d
194, 197 (1967), the court expressed a preference for promissory estoppel over "such classic
theories of contract law as failure of consideration and mutuality of obligation." C1, Gill
v. United States Rubber Co., 195 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1961); Hardin v. Eska Co., 256
Iowa 371, 127 N.W.2d 595 (1964).
50. E.g., Devecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 A. 464 (1888).
51. As a practical matter, the requirement of "mutual inducement" between promise
and consideration has always tended to lead to an exploration of subjective factors clus-
tered around the idea of "motive." The notion that motive is an essential test of considera-
tion, though rejected by the RESTATEMENT OF CONMACrS § 84(a) (1932), still has life left
in it today.
52. E.g., Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (1861); Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 138 Mich. 612(1904).
53. The real problem with interpreting a request by the promisor in terms of con-
sideration is that it simply cannot be said that every request imports a promise.
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the recent Section 90 decisions,
however, is that significant expansion into the bargain area has occurred
in spite of well-established precedent to the contrary. In the years im-
mediately following the drafting of Section 90 it was customary for the
courts to exhibit reluctance to extend promissory estoppel to commer-
cial transactions. A major source of this reluctance was the classic case
of James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.," in which Learned Hand
held that promissory estoppel was inapplicable to a bargain promise
which occasioned reliance not constituting performance of the con-
sideration sought by the promisor. An offer which bargains for a
promise, he reasoned, is not binding until the specific return asked for
is made. If a promise contains conditions about acceptance or perform-
ance, they are entitled to full effect.55 Hence reliance not in the form
of the specified equivalent cannot affect the freedom which offer-ac-
ceptance doctrine guarantees to the promisor.5 6 It follows that the con-
ditional character of an offer which proposes an exchange precludes the
application of Section 90 because, of necessity, reliance which fails to
satisfy the conditions is unreasonable. Thus, as Judge Hand felt com-
pelled to conclude, promissory estoppel is restricted to "donative"
promises.57 The element of exchange which marks off the bargain
promise also serves to identify the bp1indaries beyond which promissory
estoppel is not permitted.
The effect of Baird was to bar the application of Section 90 to an
offer for a bilateral contract. The restriction, in actual practice, has
never been completely accepted.58 But it was not until the 1958 decision
in Drennan v. Star Paving to.59 that a theoretical bridge to the bilateral
contract was constructed. On facts almost identical to those in Baird,
the Drennan court, primarily on the basis of an analogy to the uni-
lateral contract provisions of Section 45 of the Restatement, held that a
general contractor's reliance on a paving subcontractor's bid had the
54. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). Defendant subcontractor, claiming a mistake in com-
putation, revoked his offer to supply materiqls after the general contractor had relied by
incorporating the offer in the bid for the prime contracL
55. See REsrA- ImNT oF CoNTrrAcis §§ 52, 91 (1932).
56. But an offer for an exchange is not meant to become a promise until a con-
sideration has been received, either a counter-promise or whatever else is stipulated.
To extend it would be to hold the offeror regardless of the stipulated condition of
his offer.
64 F.2d at 346. See generally 1 CORiN §§ 62, 63.
57. 64 F.2d at 346.
58. E.g., Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941);
Northwestern Eng'r Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.A.2d 879 (1943).
59. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
355
The Yale Law Journal
effect of making the bid irrevocable. 60 The technique was first to find in
the offer an implied subsidiary promise not to revoke, based upon the
promisee's reasonable and foreseeable change of position in reliance
upon the offer.61 Once the subsidiary promise, which was unsupported
by consideration and therefore gratuitous, had been implied, the refer-
ence to Section 90 in the comment to Section 4502 was the vehicle for
invoking promissory estoppel as the ground for enforcement.0
3
Justice Traynor's opinion for the court in Drennan is a landmark
because it opens up for exploration ground not previously considered
available to Section 90. In challenging the rationale of the Baird de-
cision, it also represents one of the few serious efforts to provide a
theoretical basis for the application of promissory estoppel in the
context of business transactions. It should be noted, however, that the
theory articulated in Drennan is far from a license to enlarge the scope
of Section 90 without limit. The effect of the case is only to make
certain offers irrevocable until the offeree has had a reasonable op-
portunity to accept,0 4 which may explain why Drennan has not been
widely invoked outside its factual setting.
Aside from the interest created by Drennan, there appears to be no
widespread concern with the disparity between the orthodox theory of
promissory estoppel and current applications of Section 90. Nor is there
agreement as to the continuing vitality of the Baird rationale. Many of
60. Plaintiff, a general contractor, had solicited bids from various subcontractors for
the paving work to be done on a construction project on which plaintiff was preparing
to bid for the prime contract. Defendant submitted the lowest bid for the paving and
plaintiff, according to the custom in the trade, used defendant's bid in computing his
own bid. The plaintiff's bid, which listed defendant as a sub, was accepted the same day
it was submitted. The following day defendant revoked his bid on the ground that a
mistake in computation had been made. Plaintiff sued to recover the increased cost of
having the paving work done by another sub. The California Supreme Court affirmed a
judgment for the difference between defendant's bid and the actual cost of the paving
work.
61. "Reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change in position
affords a compelling basis ... for implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer
for a bilateral contract." 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at 760.
62. In discussing the theory of an implied promise not to revoke, Restatement § 45
says that "merely acting in justifiable reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as
sufficient reason for making a promise binding (see § 90)." RESTArEENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 45, comment b at 54 (1932).
63. Since the general could reasonably be expected to rely upon the sub's bid, the
court reasoned that "reasonable reliance serves to hold the offeror in lieu of the con-
sideration ordinarily required to make the offer binding." 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at
760.
64. The effect of Drennan is simply to keep the power of acceptance alive for a rea-
sonable time after the general contract is awarded. If the general contractor delays
acceptance, or reopens negotiations, the protection made available by Section 90 Is lost.
51 Cal. 2d at 415, 333 P.2d at 760. See R. J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194,
247 P.2d 817 (1952). Cf. Northern Commercial Co. v. United Automotive, 101 F. Supp.
169 (D. Alas. 1951).
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the courts that face the issue squarely still assert that Section 90 is ap-
plicable only to unconditional, or non-bargain, promises.03 Yet the
number of instances in which a court explores and applies both bar-
gain consideration and promissory estoppel theories in the same case
casts doubt on such assertions. It may well be that our motions of what
qualifies as reasonable reliance on even a highly conditional offer are
circumscribing freedoms which orthodox rules have previously assured
to the promisor. If reliance upon a bargain promise seems to justify
some form of relief, the tendency in the cases is to concentrate upon the
particular elements of Section 90 rather than upon the proper function
of that section in the context of general contract theory.00 The practical
result is that promisors are required to assume greater responsibility
for expensive action occasioned by their promises, regardless of the
conditions under which the promises were made.
With these general problems in mind, we turn to a closer examina-
tion of the various ways in which promissory estoppel is being used
today.
B. Preliminary Negotiations and Defective Promises
The offer-acceptance rules which dominate contract formation reflect
the importance we attach to bargains arrived at through the interplay
of private interests. The general objective of these assorted rules is to
guarantee parties seeking an exchange extensive freedom to express, or
to refuse to express, a willingness to be bound. Thus, a proposal does
not ordinarily subject the proposer to liability unless a variety of safe-
guards are satisfied. 6 Numerous rules permit a change of mind in the
course of bargaining. 68 Doubtful responses operate to keep negotia-
tions alive.69 The occurrence of such fortuitous events as death, super-
vening impossibility or frustration, insanity, and delay wipe clean the
slateY° The difficulties resulting from communication across great dis-
tances are taken into account in determining whether a party shall be
65. E.g., Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Ore. 1967). In
Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), the court, in dictum.
says that the theory of promissory estoppel will not be applied in a ca.se of a bargained.
for exchange even though the elements of promissory estoppel are satisfied.
66. What this means essentially is that the traditional distinction between bargained.
for and unbargained-for reliance is being abandoned.
67. REsrATnhmET OF Coz'NAaers §§ 24-33 (1932) describes the elements of an operative
offer.
68. Rules about the effect of rejection or revocation of offers are contained in REsrAT-E.
a.mr. OF CoTmRAcs §§ 35-45 (1932).
69. See generally RESTAT NMNT OF CoRAcrs §§ 59-63 (1932).
70. REsTAmENr OF CoN-racTs § 35 (1932). In some instances relief for mistake is
made available. Id. § 71.
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held to have agreed to a -ontract. 71 In short, the rules which regulate
the bargaining process seek to insure that, in most instances, obliga-
tion attaches only when it has been deliberately undertaken.
Because the doctrine ofk promissory estoppel imposes liability without
regard to expressed intention, its use in pre-agreement negotiations is
bound to alter the traditi6nal scheme of offer and acceptance. This is
particularly so where, after lengthy and expensive negotiations, no
agreement is in fact reached. In just such a case the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, solely on the ground of promissory estoppel, approved an
assessment of damages against a party whose unfulfilled "promises and
assurances," made in the course of bargaining, had left the other party
with extensive reliance losses. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.72 evolved
from a proposal by defendant to establish plaintiff in one of its stores as
a franchise operator, provided plaintiff would invest a specified amount
of capital and perform certain other conditions. The parties discussed
the matter in various stages for more than two years, with defendant at
each stage assuring plaintiff that he would get his franchise upon per-
formance of the stated conditions, some of which were added as matters
progressed.73 The termination of negotiations apparently resulted from
defendant's insistence that plaintiff supply an amount of capital nearly
twice the sum originally requested. By that time, as a result of de-
fendant's urging, plaintiff had sold his bakery business and building,
sold a small grocery operation which had been purchased in order to
gain experience, made a payment on the site for the proposed franchise,
incurred moving expenses and arranged for a house rental. 74 The
Wisconsin court, reasoning that promissory estoppel contemplates an
award of such damages "as are necessary to prevent injustice," awarded
plaintiff the amount of the actual expenses and losses he had incurred .7The Hoffman decision is highly significant in several respects. First,
it must be recognized that the responsibilities imposed by the decision
71. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 64-69 (1932).
72. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
78. The court expressly found that the evidence would not support a finding that
defendant's promises were made in "bad faith with any present intent that they would
not be fulfilled .. .." Id. at 695, 133 N.W.2d at 273.
74. The general thrust of the evidence in the case is that Red Owl's agents Induced
plaintiff to undertake a course of conduct which would financially and professionally
enable him to move into the operation of the grocery franchise.
75. 26 Wis. 2d at 701, 133 N.W.2d at 275-77. Plaintiff was awarded damages of $2000
for the loss incurred on the sale of the bakery, $1000 as the cost of the land option, and
$265 moving and home rental expenses. The court refused to award lost profits in con-
nection with the sale of the interim grocery business, limiting plaintiff's recovery to the
actual loss sustained measured by the difference between the sales price and the fair
market value.
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upon a contract negotiator who induces prejudicial reliance, and then
withdraws, are somewhat unusual. If the case is thought of as involving
a promise to consummate a deal, it sounds a retreat from the common
law view that breach of an agreement to agree is not actionable. 0 In
addition, Hoffman may be viewed as establishing the beginnings of an
"important new legal duty of good faith in the conduct of contract
negotiations."7 7 But for our purposes, the significance of the case lies in
the manner in which it rationalizes its application of Section 90. The
parties in Hoffman dealt with each other with the intent of effecting a
business exchange without reaching agreement on a contract. In fact,
the failure to reach agreement upon essential terms prevented defen-
dant's promises from achieving even the level of an operative offer."8
Nevertheless, the absence of the elements of a traditional contract was
deemed immaterial in an action rounded on promissory estoppel.
In the judgement of the court, enforcement of a promise under Section
90 is not based on breach of contract, nor is it "the equivalent of a
breach of contract action."80
By freeing the promise which triggers application of the section
from the context of offer-acceptance rules, Hoffman does away with
the bridge commonly used to link promissory estoppel with orthodox
consideration doctrine. The key to the court's opinion is its apparent
belief that the conventional use of promissory estoppel as a "substitute
for consideration" in connection with gratuitous promises is now ob-
solete and that Section 90 should serve as a distinct basis of liability
without regard to theories of bargain, contract, or consideration. The
criteria which justify and limit the application of promissory estoppel
are to be determined exclusively by what Section 90 says about the
effects of nonperformance of promises.8' The factual context out of
which a given case evolves, whether bargain or gratuity, is presumably
76. See cases and discussion in 51 CoIE.LL L.Q. 351. 353-55 (1966).
77. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. RFV. 195, 223-25 (1968).
78. Because agreement was never reached on the terms of construction and occupancy
of the building, the question was raised as to "whether the promise necessary to sustain
a cause of action for promissory estoppel must embrace all essential details of a proposed
transaction ...so as to be the equivalent of an offer that would result in a binding
contract... if the promisee were to accept .... " 26 Wis. 2d at 697, 133 N.W.2d at 274-75.
79. The Hoffman court emphasized that Section 90 imposes no requirement that a
promise giving rise to the doctrine of promissory estoppel be "so comprehensive in scope
as to meet the requirements of an offer .... " Id. at 698, 133 NV.2d at 275.
80. Id. at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275. See p. 378 & notes 194-95 infra.
81. Assuming the factual tests of foreseeable, reasonable, and serious reliance are
satisfied, Hoffman contemplates that the final decision to invoke Section 90 in order to
avoid injustice is reserved to the court in the form of a "policy decision" which "neces-
sarily embraces an element of discretion." 26 Wis. 2d at 698, 133 NAV.2d at 275.
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beside the point. If the tests of Section 90 are satisfied, Hoffman argu-
ably makes promissory estoppel applicable throughout the negotiating
process.
The potential sweep of Section 90 presaged by the Hoffman litigation
does raise certain problems. In the first place, the use of the doctrine in
pre-agreement bargaining is inconsistent with a line of authority-
based on two well-established principles-holding that preliminary
negotiations will not support a promissory estoppel. 2 The first of these
principles maintains that pre-agreement discussions and negotiations
can at most constitute an agreement to agree, which is not generally en-
forceable.8 3 The other goes to the essence of the general estoppel con-
cept. Conventional theory says that a contract may not be created by
estoppel; rather, estoppel may operate only to deny the existence of
an otherwise binding contract. 84 It may serve defensively, as a shield,
but not as a sword.8 5 The latter difficulties are probably not formidable
in light of the major inroads into traditional estoppel theory already
made by the development of promissory estoppel in the option and con-
struction bidding cases.80 Nevertheless, where the estoppel idea has on
previous occasions been used affirmatively in the bargaining process,
the decisive promise was usually fully effective as an offer."1 With
respect to the allocation of the risks of reliance inherent in business
negotiations, it would appear that the practical differences between a
clearly expressed offer and a promise which contemplates the settling
of other matters ought to be taken into account. The original judgment
that Section 90 was not to apply to bargains was undoubtedly influ-
enced by doubts about the reasonableness, in bargain situations, of
reliance that takes unbargained-for forms. Those same doubts are
relevant to the negotiation stages of bargain.
It may be expected, however, that courts will not allow Section 90
82. See, e.g., Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir.
1957); C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 414 P.2d 878, 878-79
(1966).
83. National Dollar Stores v. Wagnon, 97 Cal. App. 2d 915, 219 P.2d 49 (1950). But cl.
Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
84. Western Contracting Corp. v. Sooner Constr. Co., 256 F. Supp. 163, 168 (W.D.
Okla. 1966).
85. See pp. 376-77 & notes 182-87 infra.
86. The notion that an estoppel can arise because of reliance on a promise as to
the future is, of course, inconsistent with the conventional limitation of estoppel to
reliance upon a factual misrepresentation. See generally 30 TExAs L. REv. 903 (1952).
87. The construction bidding cases which employ Section 90 in the tradition of
Drennan v. Star Paving Co. involve clearly expressed offers. Cf. Leo F. Piazza Paving Co.
v. Bebek & Brkich, 141 Cal. App. 2d 226, 296 P.2d 368 (1956). The same is true with
respect to the option cases.
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free rein in bargain negotiation contexts. If promissory estoppel is to
provide a standard of fairness by which the conduct of negotiations may
be judged, it is likely that the courts will examine the reasonableness
of alleged reliance with some care. Deliberate risk-taking prior to agree-
ment will clearly be treated differently from a change of position in
response to a promise.88 The taking of steps designed primarily to en-
hance the chances of reaching agreement, moreover, even if requested
by the other party, involves the risk that benefits derived will render
loss difficult to demonstrate in court.89 Promisees seeking to invoke
Section 90 on the basis of pre-agreement action in reliance are partic-
ularly vulnerable to the claim that ordinary care was not exercised.Y0
Where protracted business negotiations involve a number of parties, as
was the case in Corbit v. .L. Case Co.,91 or a complex transaction, as in
Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. K-Way Associates,92 the problems of proof of tile
elements of promissory estoppel are similar to those commonly asso-
ciated with conspiracy litigation-the significance of action in reliance
may simply be lost in a host of evidentiary disputes. Considerations like
these, together with the broad scope of judicial review made available
by the generalized tests of Section 90, may well minimize the hazards
of hasty applications of the reliance doctrine in bargain contexts.
Section 90 is also being used as a basis for enforcement of promises
which under traditional theory would be held indefinite and hence
unenforceable. It has long been customary for the courts and com-
mentators to recite that only a genuine promise will support an action
grounded on promissory estoppel.9 3 The idea behind the requirement
is simply that promissory estoppel protects reasonable reliance, and
that, in the nature of things, reliance is reasonable only if it is induced
88. As to the financial gambles that typically accompany a business deal, and the
safeguards afforded by Section 90, see Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp.
616, 619-20 (D. Ore. 1967).
89. In Slater v. Geo. B. Clarke & Sons, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 814 (D. Del. 1960), action in
reliance which improved plaintiffs bargaining position had the effect of preventing him
from showing any real damage occasioned by the inducement.
90. Actual or constructive notice that the finality of negotiations depends upon some
formal act, such as the execution of a writing or home office approval, may well defeat
reliance claims.
91. 70 Wash. 2d 522, 424 P.2d 290 (1967).
92. 388 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1968).
93. See IA CoRnrN §§ 200, 201, for a discussion of the requirement of a "real" or
"actual" promise. Numerous claims based on Section 90 have been denied on the ground
that the existence of a promise was not proved. E.g., Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Barker-Lubin Co. v. Wanous, 26 Ill. App.
2d 151, 167 N.E.2d 797 (1960); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 263 Minn. 520, 117
N.V.2d 213 (1962); Hilton v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 66 Wash. 2d 30, 400 P.2d 772
(1965); Ahnapee & Western Ry. v. Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 148 N.W.2d 616 (1967).
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by an actual promise. With the movement of Section 90 into the area
of bargains, the promise foundation of the reliance doctrine is subject
to additional stress in connection with promises that are "indefinite"
because vague or incomplete, or ones that are "illusory" because, in
reality, they promise nothing.
Reliance upon indefinite promises has long been recognized as a
legitimate basis for the filling of gaps in contract law, as in the implica-
tion of agreement or the fashioning of remedies."4 If an indefinite
promise is given in an exchange, and the promisee renders full or
partial performance, a contract results.95 But the effect of detrimental
reliance not consisting of the performance sought by an indefinite
promise is less clearY9 The conditional nature of a bargain promise,
coupled with the factor of indefiniteness, would seem to have a limiting
effect on Section 90 when action in reliance is not in the form of actual
performance of an indefinite agreement.9 7
Generally, however, the trend is toward wider use of Section 90 to
enforce bargains which are otherwise unenforceable for indefiniteness
under conventional rules. In the Texas case of Wheeler v. White,98 a
written agreement purported to obligate defendant to obtain or furnish
plaintiff with construction financing for a shopping center. In reliance
upon defendant's assurances that the financing would be provided,
plaintiff proceeded to demolish existing buildings and generally pre-
pare the site for the new venture.9 9 Upon learning that the loan would
not be made, plaintiff sued to recover damages for breach of the written
contract. Because the writing failed to particularize the terms upon
which the loan was to be repaid, the intermediate appellate court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the contract was too indefinite to
94. See generally 1 CORBIN §§ 29, 95, 101, 102, 143.
95. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1932). Cf. Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1926).
96. One source of confusion is the distinction often made between indefinite and
illusory promises. In the case of the latter, prestigious authority holds unequivocally
that promissory estoppel has no application regardless of induced reliance. Spooner v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955). Cf. Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co.,
116 Conn. 357, 165 A. 205 (1933); Jones v. Vulcan Materials Co., 145 S.E2d 268 (Ga. App.
1965). See generally 1A CoRuBIN § 201. The absence of similarly sweeping doctrine with
respect to indefinite promises is probably a result of the view that, while any reliance
upon a wholly illusory promise is likely to be unreasonable, reliance upon a promise
which is merely incomplete may be quite reasonable.
97. While reliance in this context may not cure substantive defects, it may make a
contractual remedy appropriate. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 33(3) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1964).
98. 398 S.-W.2d 93 (Irex. S p. Ct. 165).
99. The demolished buildings allegedly had a market value of 458,500 and a rental
value of $400 monthly. Id. at 95.
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enforce. 10 The Texas Supreme Court agreed that indefiniteness pre-
cluded recovery on a conventional breach of contract theory, but
reversed and remanded on the ground that the complaint stated a cause
of action on the theory of promissory estoppel.10 The decision was
explicitly premised on the proposition that detrimental reliance oc-
casioned by "an otherwise unenforceable promise" may present a
"substantial and compelling claim for relief" under Section 90.102
A group of cases involving franchised dealer contracts provide
further evidence of the impact of Section 90 upon traditionally unen-
forceable bargains. The broad powers typically reserved to one or both
parties to the franchise arrangement generally do not meet the criteria
of established consideration doctrine. 03 If the agreement imposes no
real obligation on a party, or is expressly terminable at will, a court
may well find the agreement illusory and therefore void for lack of
mutuality of obligation. 04 A decision adopting this rationale could be
expected to deny recovery of a dealer's reliance losses as well.105 Never-
theless, over the years some limited protection of reliance losses has
been recognized on the basis of the tort notion that a dealer ought to be
entitled to enjoy the fruits of a franchise or distributorship at least for
a period of time which permits him to recoup his investment.100 And
there is little doubt that Section 90 significantly reinforces the various
reasons for reimbursement of a dealer's reliance losses. '
100. 385 S.V.2d 619 (rex. Civ. App. 1964).
101. The court stated that lost profits are not recoverable under the theory of promis.
sory estoppel; rather, "the promisee is to be allowed to recover no more than reliance
damages measured by the detriment sustained." 398 S.W.2d at 97.
102. Id. at 96.
103. The cases are collected in Annot., 19 A.L.Rl.d 196 (1968).
104. E.g., Velie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Car Co., 194 F. 324 (7th Cir. 1912). Cf.
Hunt Foods v. Phillips, 248 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1957); Utility Appliance Corp. v. Kuhns,
393 Pa. 414, 143 A.2d 35 (1958).
105. E.g., Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940); Ford Motor Co. v.
Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (10th Cir. 1933). Cf. Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford
Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
106. For discussion and cases see Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination
Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465, 479-83 (1967). As to the period of
time for recoupment of a dealer's investment, see Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm
Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968), which leaves open the possibility that 13 years
might not be unreasonable.
A well-known case usually associated with promissory estoppel, Goodman v. Dicker,
169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948), may represent nothing more than a sophisticated application
of this earlier line of cases. Though the court does not mention Section 90, perhaps
because of some fairly obvious difficulties with the specific requirements of that section,
the case is significant because reliance is the ground for recovery of expenses incurred in
preparation to operate under a franchise which was never granted.
107. See L. S. Good & Co. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. W. Va.
1968);- Hardin v. Eska Co., 256 Iowa 371, 127 N.W.2d 595 (1964). If reliance is sufficiently
prejudicial, a court may be more disposed to avoid mutuality problems by going directly
to promissory estoppeL E.g., Whorral v. Drewrys Ltd., 214 F. Supp. 269 (S.). Iowa 1963).
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So long as a dealer restricts his lawsuit to expenses actually incurred,
Section 90 will apparently allow recovery without opening the Pan-
dora's box of problems relating to the general unenforceability of
dealership agreements. And even if lost profits are sought as well,
Section 90 may still be of assistance, by way of the doctrine that an
exclusive dealership agreement supported by consideration "addi-
tional" to the personal services of the dealer, even though expressly
terminable at will, is enforceable for a reasonable time and may be
terminated without cause only upon notice. 08 The practical effect of
this doctrine is that cancellation without notice gives rise to a damage
claim which may include the profit margin on sales the dealer might
have made during the time the agreement would have been effective
after receipt of notice. The significance of promissory estoppel in this
connection is that it may be treated as satisfying the requirement of
"additional consideration," thereby extending limited protection to
the expectation interest. 0 9
When a court finds that a bargain promise is indefinite or illusory,
or that it lacks mutuality, it is really saying that the theory of considera-
tion, as applied to the particular facts, has not been satisfied. If the
court then proceeds on the theory of promissory estoppel, the necessary
implication is that the bargain requirement is not as essential in ex-
change transactions as orthodox doctrine would have us believe. Rather,
detrimental reliance emerges as the decisive factor; the promise itself
is no longer as significant as the harm it precipitates. The cases of
unenforceable bargains-whether for lack of agreement, indefiniteness
of language or lack of mutuality of obligation-clearly demonstrate
that when reliance is justifiable and serious, the promise requirement
of Section 90 is not difficult to satisfy. Indeed, there is considerable
evidence that strict requirements of promissory language are not being
applied in Section 90 cases today. Section 90 promises are more fre-
quently implied from conduct than was previously true,"0 and patterns
of conduct which resembles factual representations rather than promises
often suffice."'
108. The cases are collected in Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 196 (1968).
109. See C.C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long Mfg. Co., 257 Iowa 107, 136 N.W.2d 276,
278 (1965); Hardin v. Eska Co., 256 Iowa 371, 127 N.W.2d 595 (1964). Cf. Bixby v. Wilson
& Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961). Specific enforcement of the franchise agreement
on the ground of reliance does not appear to have much case support. Compare Whorral
v. Drewrys Ltd., 214 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Iowa 1963), with Meredith v. John Deere Plow
Co., 261 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959).
110. E.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Holman, 330 F.2d 142, 151 (5th Cir. 1964); Rennie
& Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1957); Weiner v.
Romley, 94 Ariz. 40, 45, 381 P.2d 581, 584 (1963).
111. See Hilltop Properties v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965),
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These uses of Section 90 in the bargain context have the obvious
effect of limiting powers traditionally exercised by offerors. The danger
in this development is that the insistence of traditional theory upon
clear promises, upon close attention to the reasonableness of conduct in
reliance, and upon external indicia of intent to be bound,112 fulfill a
valid purpose and should not be hastily discarded in the effort to pro-
tect every relying promisee. That consideration rules perform a vital
function in providing evidence that "something happened" should not
be overlooked."13 Whether or not the limitations inherent in Section 90
will keep the reliance principle within bounds in the bargain context
will ultimately depend upon the degree to which courts recognize the
dangers of imposing liability too readily in the formative stages of the
bargaining process.
C. The Reinforcement of Offers Through Reliance
While the general problems relating to the revocability of offers,
particularly those presented in the construction bidding cases, have
been the subject of much study and discussion,114 the application of
Section 90 to offers raises a number of questions which have not yet
been answered.
It should be recalled that contract doctrine generally classifies offers
under the same consideration rules as promises. Thus, unless an offer
is supported by consideration, the offeror retains the power to revoke
until the moment of acceptance.'" If the offer is expressly or impliedly
"firm,""' - the potential injustice of the operation of the revocation rule
Greene v. Wilson, 208 Cal. App. 2d 852, 2-5 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1962); Hessler. Inc. v. Farrell.
- Del. -, 226 A.2d 708 (1967); Edwards v. Smith, 322 S."W.2d 770 (Mo. Sup. CE. 1959).
See Patterson, An Apology For Consideration, 58 COLUm. L. Rav. 929, 948.49 (1958).
112. The evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent, and channeling functions of formalities
are perhaps less easy to identify where the agreement-making process fails to produce
reliable assurances that deliberate risk-taking occurred. The fact of reliance during bar-
gaining, or subsequent to an inconclusive termination of negotiations, may raise an
elementary question of fairness. See generally Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLUM.
L. Ray. 799, 801-12 (1941).
113. See Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 CoLum. L. REy. 929, 933 (1958).
On the basis of cases to date, the test of foresecability would seem to have the greatest
limiting effect on Section 90 in the area of pre-agreement negotiations and promises
found defective under consideration doctrine.
114. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction
Industry, 19 U. Cm. L. Ray. 237 (1952); Sharp, Promise, Mistake and Reciprocity, 19
U. Cm. L. REv. 286 (1952); Note, Once Around the Flag Pole: Construction Bidding
and Contracts at Formation, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 816 (1964); Note, Another Look at Con-
struction Bidding and Contracts At Formation, 53 VA. L. Rav. 1720 (1967): Note. 59
COLUm. L. Ray. 355 (1959); Note, 18 MANE L. Rv. 297 (1966); Note. 39 Ta2aPI.E LQ.
489 (1966).
115. RFSTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 47 (1932).
116. The term generally refers to an offer which contains reliable assurances against
revocation. See Sharp, Pacta Sunt Serranda, 41 COLUm. L. Rav. 783, 793 (1941).
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is obvious. One avenue of escape is made available by consideration
doctrine in the part performance rule of Section 45 of the Restate-
ment.117 The principle of that section, however, does not provide a
foundation sufficiently broad to include many cases of justifiable reli-
ance arising today.118 It is expressly limited to offers for unilateral
contracts and precludes revocation prior to acceptance only where the
action in reliance constitutes a part of the actual performance made the
price of the offer. 1 9 If justifiable reliance in the form of preparations
to perform is to have the effect of preventing revocation, the most
readily available theory is that of promissory estoppel.'2 0 Yet, aside
from the construction bidding cases, there is little evidence that non-
performance reliance upon unaccepted offers prompts explicit use of
Section 90 as a ground of irrevocability.' 2 ' And even in those cases in
which the section is applied, the mode of application is vulnerable to
objections of inconsistency, invalid analogy, and circuitous reasoning.
The outcome of current construction bidding litigation usually
depends upon the extent to which a particular court accepts the
Drennan rout' 22 around the obstacles of Baird.'23 In view of the
117. E.g., Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (1917).
118. Even a casual examination of the reports should make it clear that Section 45 Is
invoked in contract litigation much less often than is Section 90. This may suggest that
a greater number of reliance claims arise from the bilateral than the unilateral setting.
It may also suggest that Section 90 is operating as a substitute for Section 45. See Murray,
Contracts: A New Design For the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 005 (1968).
119. RESTATEMENT OF CONarAcrs § 45, comment a at 53 (1932): "What is tendered must
be part of the actual performance requested ih order to preclude revocatidn under this
Section."
120. E.g., Anthony v. Hilo Elec. Light Co., - Hawaii -, 442 P.2d 64 (1968); Dunnan
& Jeffrey, Inc. v. Gross Telecasting, Inc., 7 Mich. App. 113, 151 N.W.2d 194 (1967);
Spitzli v. Guth, 112 Misc. 630, 183 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. Oneida Co. 1920); Bretz v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 171, 16 N.E.2d 272 (1938). It should be noted that
while some offers of a bilateral contract unquestionably call for a return promise, others
can fairly be said to contemplate some forms of reliance prior to the making of a return
promise. In the latter situation, part performance prior to acceptance may create a
contract. RFSrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1932).
121. For example, it might be expected that Section 90 could comfortably be used
to prevent revocation in the real estate brokerage cases. But the cases seldom use the
theory of promissory estoppel for this purpose. It may be that there is a general under-
standing that offerors, before acceptance, have no reason to expect substantial, reliance
that is not part performance, and therefore the issue is not frequently raised.
122. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958). See pp. 355-57 & notes 59-66 supra.
123. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). See p. 355 & notes 54-57 supra. Though Baird
and Drennan produce widely divergent results, it is interesting that they both purport
to observe traditional offer-acceptance rules. In Baird it is the offer which authorizes
revocation until acceptance, thereby precluding the application of promissory estoppel.
On the other hand, the offer in Drennan provides assurance against revocation and
makes the general's reliance reasonable. At the same time, even Drennan concedes the
common law effect of a deviant response to an offer. Thus, again in contrast to other
factual settings, the continuation of negotiations past the point of the general's use of
the sub's bid operates to remove the conditions which justify the use of promissory
estoppel. See, e.g., Heddon v. Lupinsky, 405 Pa. 609, 176 A.2d 406 (1962); Brooks v.
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frequent applications of Section 90 to bargains, it is surprising that
Baird has retained as much vitality as it has. Aside from the techni-
calities of theory, the blunt thrust of the case is that Section 90 has no
relevance to a promise which offer a bargain. A number of courts
have, in effect, adopted this philosophy,2 4 depriving themselves of a
flexible tool for conforming law to common commercial expectations
and practices.2 The liberalizing effect of Justice Traynor's opinion in
Drennan is therefore a valuable contribution to legal doctrine. How-
ever, because the opinion may well be relied upon to justify continued
expansion of Section 90, the difficulties with the Drennan application
of promissory estoppel to offers ought to be kept in mind.
It will be recalled that Drennan, by reference to Section 45 of the
Restatement, found in the sub's offer an implied promise against revo-
cation which, although gratuitous, was binding under Section 90.120
The first problem with the case is the inconsistency between Justice
Traynor's recognition that Section 90 is restricted to gratuitous prom-
iseslar and his ultimate application of the section to a bargain. In
addition, the analogies drawn from Section 45 in Drennan are not
entirely free of difficulty. The subsidiary promises which may be im-
plied from Section 45 offers are in fact themselves conditional upon
tender of part of the performance specified in the offer.m  It would
seem that the subsidiary promise to which Section 90 was applied must
also have been conditional upon some exchangeY.12  So long as reliance
is the justification for implying the subsidiary promise, as well as the
basis for giving the promise the effect of traditional consideration,
there is a risk that the courts will emphasize the latter aspect of the
transaction and thereby lose Aight of the practical reasons for protecting
pre-acceptance reliance.
Oberlander, 49 111. App. 2d 312, 199 N.E.2d 613 (1964). Since the Drennan rationale
agrees with Baird on the point that mere use of the sub's bid does not bind the sub on
the theoxy of an acceptance, N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736,
738 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Norcross v. Winters, 209 Cal. App. 2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1962).
it should be fairly obvious that, in the offer context, traditional contract doctrine con-
trols Section 90 far more than is generally true in the promise context.
124. E.g., Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
125. See generally Sharp, supra note 114.
126. See p. 356 9: notes 61-63 supra.
127. "The very purpose of Section 90 is to make a promise binding even though there
was no consideration 'in the sense of something that is bargained for and given in ex-
change'." 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at 760 (1958).
128. R STATEMNT OF CoNTRACTs § 45, comment b at 54 (1932):
The main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that if part
of the requested performance is given, the offeror Will n0t revoke his offer ....
129. The response of the Drennan court was that the reference to Section 90 in the
comment to Section 45 "makes clear that consideration for such a promise is not alwa)s
necessary."' 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at 760.
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There are obvious advantages in frank recognition that foreseeable
and substantial reliance upon unaccepted offers, standing alone, is a
sufficient reason for binding offerors. The tentative draft of the second
Restatment of Contracts takes this position in a new section dealing
with reliance prior to acceptance.'20 Its approach makes clear that the
reliance principle is applicable to bargains, whether unilateral or bi-
lateral in form. Presumably this would permit the use of promissory
estoppel theory to prevent revocation of an offer of a unilateral con-
tract-a question presently unsettled because of the exclusion of
preparations to perform from the scope of Section 4513-thereby help-
ing to clarify two problems which currently obscure the decisional
role of Section 90.
D. The Bargain and Its Aftermath
Our examination of the role of promissory estoppel now shifts from
the earlier stages of the agreement-making process to the point of
contract formation and immediately beyond. Attention will be con-
centrated on the functions performed by Section 90 in the actual
striking of the bargain. What is happening in the cases at this point
bears heavily upon the interaction of the reliance factor and traditional
notions of bargain.
Time and again, in decisions involving clearly commercial agree-
ments, Section 90 is used by the courts as the sole or alternative ground
for enforcement. The cases do not fall into any consistent factual
pattern. They involve a variety of business activities, ranging from
financing the construction of buildings' 32 to production of goods'
and organization and operation of enterprises. 1 4 A large number of
130. Section 89B(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) provides:
An offer which the offcror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the
extent necessary to avoid injustice.
Section 89B(l) provides for irrevocable written offers which meet certain requirements,
as does Section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Cf. Curtiss Candy Co. v. Silber-
man, 45 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1930).
131. Because of the often vague line separating performance from preparations to
perform, the respective areas of operation of Sections 45 and 90 have been difficult to
distinguish. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965). Some courts have
indicated that preparations to perform will provide a basis for enforcement of a Ini-
lateral contract on the rationale of Section 90. E.g., Lazarus v. American Motors Corp.,
21 Wis. 2d 76, 123 N.W2d 548 (1963).
132. E.g., Lehrer v. McCloskey Homes, Inc., 245 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1957); Day v. Mortgage
Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 428 P.2d 524 (1967).
133. E.g., Haveg Corp. v. Guyer, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 231 (1967).
134. E.g., Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610, 49
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cases also arise from arrangements relating to the employment rela-
don.135 Since a bargained-for exchange is normally apparent from the
face of the transaction, the question arises why the courts believe it
necessary, or even desirable, to by-pass bargain principles in favor of
promissory estoppel.
The beginnings of an explanation lie in the conventional unilateral
contract, where action in reliance serves the dual function of mani-
festing assent and supplying a justification for enforcement in the
form of consideration. The distinguishing characteristic of reliance
in this context is that it was deliberately made the price of the promise.
In order for the theory of promissory estoppel to find application in
such cases, a court must give full effect to the element of reliance and
ignore the element of price. This is precisely what is happening in
those decisions which see in the acceptance of an offer of a unilateral
contract the justification for application of promissory estoppel.130 A
standard contract theory is also frequently recognized in such cases,
with the confusion between acceptance and prejudicial reliance com-
pounded by sweeping opinions which conceal the necessity of reinter-
preting the transaction in order to accommodate both theories.13 - And
the mistake of treating bargained-for reliance as a justification for
invoking promissory estoppel carries over to the bilateral contract
cases as well. It is not at all unusual to find in the reports cases tried
principally on theory of an alleged exchange of promises, but decided
solely or partially on the theory of Section 90.138 A narrow view of
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966); Central Heat, Inc. v. The Daily Olympian, Inc, - Waish. 2d -, 443
P.2d 544 (1968).
135. E.g., Pitts v. McGraw-Edison Co., 329 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1964); Gill v. United
States Rubber Co., 195 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1961); Thomson v. International Alliance.
Stage Employees, 232 Cal. App. 2d 446, 42 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1965); Van Hook v. Waiters
Alliance Local 17, 158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 523 P.2d 212 (1958); Hessler v. Farrell, - Del.
-, 226 A.2d 708 (1967); Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777(Fla. 1966); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 10, 195 N.E.2d 250 (1964);
Bredemann v. Vaughan Mfg. Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 232, 188 N.E.2d 746 (1963); Dewein v.
Dewein's Estate, 80 IMI. App. 2d 446, 174 N.E.2d 875 (1961); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.. 322S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Hilton v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 66 Wash. 2d 30.
400 P.2d 772 (1965); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 5S7
(1967).
136. The striking thing is not that an acceptance is mistaken for prejudicial reliance
within the meaning of Section 90, but that the disposition to equate the two ideas
persists to the degree it does. See, e.g., Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co.,
239 Cal. App. 2d 610, 49 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966). In Feiler v. Midway Sales, Inc., 363 Mich.
105, 110, 108 N.W.2d 884, 887 (1961), the court grounds application of Section 90 on the
"performance of the conditions" specified in the promise.
137. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Anchor Cas. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 175, 22 Cal. Rptr.
278 (1962). Cf. Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State, 23 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605(1965).
138. E.g., Gill v. United States Rubber Co., 195 F. Supp. 837 (N.:. Ind. 1961); Haveg
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consideration doctrine may account for some of these decisions,"30 but
again and again the rendering of performance by a party to a bilateral
contract leads courts to believe that the reliance test of Section 90 has
been satisfied.140
Since the element of reliance is indispensable to both promissory
estoppel and the unilateral contract, difficulties in preserving the sep-
arate identities of the theories are to some extent understandable. But
why performance of a bilateral contract should look like the detri-
mental reliance contemplated by Section 90 is less clear. Perhaps a
partial explanation is that the cases in question often resemble half-
completed exchanges, with the reliance factor reinforced by economic
values conferred by full performance on one side of the bargain.
41 In
such situations broad classifications will effectively dispose of a case
with no serious threat of disagreement. Another factor contributing to
careless use of Section 90 results from the factual context of the cases
involved. A noteworthy aspect of the bargain cases which employ
promissory estoppel is that the bargain itself is subject to dispute,
usually because it is oral. 42 Lawyers in preparing such cases, and
judges in deciding them, are understandably inclined to give weight
to facts which are supportable by objective proof. Demonstrated
change in business conduct is thus likely to assume an importance
which makes technicalities about inducement appear insignificant.
14
'
If a court is otherwise receptive to the broad principle of promissory
estoppel, the tests of reliance can be manipulated to support the doc-
trine. If the court takes a dim view of Section 90, strict tests of reliance
can be used to deny its application.
44
What this means is that reliance which is substantial and appears to
flow naturally from the transaction has the practical effect of inducing
courts to substitute the promissory estoppel idea for conventional
Corp. v. Guyer, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 231 (1967); Quijada v. Southern Pipe & Casing Co.,
78 Nev. 271, 371 P.2d 661 (1962).
139. E.g., Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 428 P.2d 524 (1967).
140. E.g., Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 708 (1967); Aldrich v. Forbes,
237 Ore. 559, 385 P.2d 618 (1963).
141. Action in reliance, in this context, will usually be beneficial to the promisor.
With rare exceptions, reliance which takes unbargained-for forms is not involved.
142. The extent to which Section 90 is relevant to the problems caused by the lack
of a writing is illustrated in Haveg Corp. v. Guyer, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 2'31 (1967). It
has been held that promissory estoppel cannot operate in the face of the parol evidence
rule. Joseph v. Mahoney Corp., 367 S.V.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
143. This would seem to support the notion that the reliance principle of Section 90
is becoming increasingly recognized as an independent standard of elementary fairness.
Aldrich v. Forbes, 237 Ore. 559, 385 P.2d 618 (1963).
144. See Pitts v. McGraw-Edison Co., 329 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1964).
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bargain concepts. If promissory estoppel reasonably supports a court's
statement that consideration is present, a detailed analysis of bargain
is unnecessary.' 45 These observations are subject to some qualification
in the cases involving the employment relation, particularly with re-
spect to alleged agreements for retirement benefits. Here benevolent
motives intervene to color the transaction, creating doubts about the
exchange element.14 In consequence, the theory of promissory estoppel
may be examined more closely in the context of standard considera-
tion rules, 47 and a stronger showing of the elements of Section 90
tends to be required. 48 A finding that consideration tests are not
satisfied may influence the result of the promissory estoppel approach
to the case. 49
An interesting and relatively unexplored area of the bargain field
has to do with collateral promises made either contemporaneously
with, or subsequent to, a concluded bargain. If the bargain is oral,
one party may promise, also orally, to reduce it to a writing.'5" Or, if
the promise is subsequent to the conclusion of the bargain, it may
constitute further assurance that the agreed performance will be
rendered.' 51 Such a promise may also contain assurances about the
meaning and scope of the original agreement.152 Obviously promises
of this nature collide with parol evidence and pre-existing duty rules,
as well as the Statute of Frauds. 153 Nevertheless, such promises may in
fact induce detrimental reliance. When they do, the question arises
whether Section 90 imposes obligation independent of the completed
bargain. The availability of Section 90 is particularly important in the
event the bargain is ultimately found to be unenforceable.
145. This was essentially the attitude of the court in Associated Creditors' Agency
v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 610, 49 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966). Cf. Williams Constr. Co.
v. Standard-Pacific Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 912, 918-19 (Ct. App. 1967).146. Though the theory of Section 90 is readily available in connection with promisedbenefits for services, concern with the traditional bargain idea may result in Section 90'sbeing overlooked entirely. See National Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Kalkhurst, 418 P.2d
661 (Okla. 1966).147. See Bredemann v. Vaughan Mfg. Co., 40 Il. App. 2d 232, 188 N.E.2d 746 (1963).Even though Section 90 is made the ground for relief, the court may make a special
effort to caution that the holding is not to be understood as an abandonment of the
consideration concept. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).148. See Pitts v. McGraw-Edison Co., 329 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1964); Dewein v. Dewein's
Estate, 30 Il. App. 2d 446, 174 N.E.2d 875 (1961).149. Compare Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
with Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
150. Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 708 (1967).151. Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610. 49 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1966); Dunnan & Jeffrey, Inc. v. Gross Telecasting, Inc., 7 Mich. App. 113, 151N.W.2d 194 (1967); Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 70 Wash. 2d 52-, 424 P-2d 290 (1967).152. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Holman, 330 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1964).153. See pp. 381-82 & notes 210-17 infra.
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Existing authorities suggest that expansion of promissory estoppel in
this area is both possible and likely. Wheeler v. White'54 makes clear
that the unenforceability of a bargain does not preclude application of
promissory estoppel. A significant factor in that decision was that
assurances of performance made subsequent to the bargain were the
principal cause of reliance losses.'r 5 In holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action under Section 90, the court in Wheeler em-
phasized the role of "promises designedly made to influence conduct"
without clearly separating the purported contract from the later
promises of performance. 50 It would further appear that analogies
drawn from the theory of implied subsidiary promises under Section
45 of the Restatement and the Drennan case'1 7 could be of service here.
Surely an oral promise which is clearly proved is entitled to parity with
one understood to be necessarily implied. Nevertheless, although sev-
eral recent decisions have tied results based on promissory estoppel to
collateral promises respecting performance," s courts do not yet gen-
erally appreciate the potential of Section 90 in this setting.
10
When the collateral promise is to reduce to writing an otherwise
completed bargain, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has enjoyed
only limited success as a method of hurdling the obstacle of the Statute
of Frauds. Courts have been particularly resistant to the doctrine in
cases involving oral employment contracts. 60  An outstanding example
is the case of Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc.,
01 in
which the Florida Supreme Court, apparently because of its extremely
restrictive view of Section 90, refused to so much as recognize plaintiff's
attempt to avoid the statute by distinguishing a promise to employ
from a promise to reduce the employment bargain to written form.
0 2
The cases thus stands directly opposed to the Restatement position that
substantial reliance upon a promise to deliver a writing precludes the
154. 398 S.W.2d 93 (rex. 1966). See also Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d
683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
155. Cf. Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. K-Way Associates, 388 F.2d 940, 9,47 (7th Cir. 1968)
(separate opinion of Schnackenberg, J.).
156. 398 S.W.2d at 96 (rex. 1965).
157. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
158. See cases cited note 151 supra.
159. See, e.g., Lefforge v. Rogers, 419 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1966), wheie both court and
counsel apparently missed the fairly obvious applicability of Section 90 to an oral
promise made at the point of contract formation.
160. For cases and discussion see Comment, Promissory Estoppel and Oral Employ.
ment Contracts, 24 WASH. & LFE L. REV. 347 (1967).
161. 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966).
162. The only discussion of the point appears in the opinion of the dissenting judge.
Id. at 780-82. See note 217 infra.
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raising of the statute if the effect is to create a promissory estoppel.'G3
The Restatement view necessarily recognizes that a promise to reduce
a contract to writing is directly relevant to the issue of the reasonable-
ness and foreseeability of reliance, a view more courts will have to take
if Section 90 is to become an effective device for dealing with such
promises. 164
E. Readjustment in On-going Transactions
Perhaps the most conventional application of promissory estoppel
occurs when a relationship, usually contractual, has already been estab-
lished and the rendering of performance has begun. One of the parties
then promises to vary or forfeit a non-essential term or condition of
the contract, or to surrender a defense which may arise in the future.10 5
The promise is typically unsupported by consideration, and the re-
liance which it induces is not actionable under strict contract theory
because of the rule that performance of legal duties already owed the
promisor is not consideration.'"0 But if the promise relates to the
future and induces a material change of position, the intention of
"waiver" or "abandonment" expressed in the promise combines 'with
the general estoppel idea to give rise to promissory estoppel.'07"
In examining the operation of Section 90 in the setting of on-going
transactions, it is useful to recall that the broad applicability of the
estoppel concept in our law derives from the reaction of judges to the
effects of misleading conduct. To the extent that promises produce
similar effects, they tend to be treated by means of the broad and
flexible estoppel technique, whether or not the specific tests of promis-
sory estoppel are satisfied.108 And because the cases now under con-
sideration comfortably fit the factual pattern of traditional equitable
estoppel, or estoppel in pais, it is not surprising that the requirements
of liability spelled out in Section 90 are often less rigorously applied
163. RESTATFE,T OF CONTRACTS § 178, comment f at 234-35 (1932).
164. Some courts will undoubtedly believe that the hazards of enforcement of such
promises are too great to justify the use of Section 90. See Dooley v. Lachut, - R.I. -,
234 A.2d 366 (1967); Heyman v. Adeack Realty Co., - R.I. -, 228 A.2d 578 (1967).
165. See, e.g., Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497. 196 A. 39 (1938).
166. REsTATErM OF CorNRAcrs § 76 (1932).
167. As used here, the concept of "waiver" is not confined to the usual definition of a
"voluntary relinquishment of a known right." Rather, the reliance which the waiver
induces operates to merge the latter idea with that of estoppel. See REsTATE.%'T(SEcoND) OF CoNTAcrs § 88, comment b at 113 (Tent. Draft No. 2. 1965).
168. See Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv. Maats, 279 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Hetchler v. American Life Ins. Co., 266 Mich. 608, 254 NAW. 221 (1934); Ricketts
v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.V. 365 (1898). Contra, Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305, 41
A. 352 (1898).
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in the waiver cases than in other contexts. Opinions can be found in
which the concepts of equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and
waiver are treated as indistinguishable. 6 9
In light of the fact that a formal relationship exists, the risk of serious
reliance upon a promise designed specifically to adjust that relationship
is high. Consequently, it might be expected that the waiver cases would
push toward expansion of Section 90 beyond situations of proved re-
liance to those involving a substantial likelihood of reliance. The
draft proposal of Section 90 in the second Restatement contemplates
that the reliance element may, in certain instances, be satisfied by a
showing of a probability of reliance. 70 Nevertheless, the decisions have
not, as yet, explored such prospects in explicit terms. In some of the
decisions applying Section 90 the courts appear to have believed that
a close examination of the reliance factor was unnecessary.,
7 At the
same time, however, other characteristics of the waiver cases suggest
that the courts are simply not prepared to be adventurous in their use
of Section 90 in this area. The cases are marked by substantial con-
cern about whether actual reliance did in fact occur,
1 72 whether it was
induced by the promise in question'7" and whether real injury re-
sulted. 74 This kind of administration of the reliance principle suggests
that adjustments in on-going contracts are subject to review under
169. E.g., Veasey v. La)ton, 42 Del. Ch. 155, 206 A.2d 505 (1961); Shell O11 Co. v.
Kelinson, - Iowa -, 158 N.W.2d 724 (1968). Cf. Shinabarger v. United Aircraft Corp.,
381 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1967).
This disposition, coupled with the importance of the waiver cases to the 
general
development of promissory estoppel, may explain why a number of courts have limited
their acceptance of Section 90 to the waiver category. See Southeastern Sales & Service
Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., 172 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. App. 1965). (As to the impact of
the estoppel tradition on the issue of Section 90 damages, see p. 378 & notes 198-99
infra.) With respect to the promise requirement in the waiver cases, there exists sonic
evidence of fulfillment by a course of conduct verging on misrepresentation of existing
fact. See cases cited note 111 supra. Indeed, there are instances where the exclusive
urging of Section 90 may have the effect of confusing the promise, with the result 
that
traditional theories are overlooked. While agreeing that the 
promise was made, the court
in Fedun v. Mike's Cafe, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 356, 204 A.2d 776 (1964), afJ'd, 419 l'a. 607,
213 A.2d 638 (1965), devoted its full attention to the issue of whether the promise satis
fled the tests of Section 90 and failed to consider whether an offer of a unilateral contract
had in fact been accepted. A similar disposition occurred in Aubrey v. Workman, 
384
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, comments b & c at 166-68 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1965). See generally Fuller, Consideration and Form, 11 COLUM. L. Rrv. 799,
810-12 (1941).
171. The procedural setting of a case is of course significant on this point. If the
case is not up for disposition on the merits, there may be less reason to be precise In
the handling of various theories.
172. E.g., Nichols v. Acers Co., 415 SAV.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (dictum).
173. E.g., Kaufman v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 366 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1906);
Glitsos v. Kadish, 4 Ariz. App. 134, 418 P.2d 129 (1966).
174. E.g., Weiner v. Romley. 94 Ariz. 40, 381 P.2d 581 (1963).
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standards little if any different from those generally applied in the
Section 90 cases.175
When it comes to extreme adjustments, such as alleged agreements
to rescind existing obligations, the difficulties in applying Section 90
appear to increase. To begin with, further bargaining after perfor-
mance has begun is uniquely subject to abuse because of institutional
advantages enjoyed by promisors over dependent promisees. If such
abuses do occur, courts are more likely to turn to remedial doctrines
of fairness than to bother with the requirements of Section 90.170 It
cannot realistically be contended that promises extracted by pressures
such as those so well-documented in the duress cases should be enforced
simply because they meet the Section 90 requirements.
In addition, the courts have not forgotten that a rescission is itself a
contract subject to conventional consideration requirements. 17z Three
recent decisions on point,178 moreover, demonstrate again that when
the need for consideration is considered filled by promissory estoppel,
the outlines of both theories become blurred and indistinct. All three
case arose out of negotiations looking to a total release of liability. In
each the emphasis on promissory estoppel obscures the outlines of a
potential bargain theory, while the application of Section 90 in a
traditional consideration context appears to result in a rigid but ill-
defined application of the criteria of promissory estoppel. The discus-
sion of both the reliance and promise factors in Aubrey v. Workman is
so saturated with bargain concepts that it is difficult to identify any
meaningful role for Section 90.179 Perhaps the most interesting aspect
of these particular waiver cases is that promissory estoppel generally
failed as a ground for rescission. 8 0 The explanation may simply be
175. RmTATnEm- (SEcoND) or Cov'macrs § 89D(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) states ageneral rule with respect to the effect of reliance upon adjustments in on-going transac-
tions: "A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either sideis binding... (c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material
change of position in reliance on the promise." The section is an adaptation of the
UNFOR.M CoIsxRaCsLAr CODE § 2-209.
176. The relation of promissory estoppel and the doctrines of duress and mistake is
considered in Sharp, Promise, Mistake and Reciprocity, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 286, 292-96(1952); Sharp, Pacta Sunt Serranda, 41 COLU.r. L. REv. 783, 785-88 (1941). CI. Dawson.
Economic Duress-An Fssay in Perspective, 45 MicsH. L. REV. 253 (1947).
177. See REsTATE.mE, T OF CoTAacrs § 406 (1932).
178. Mohr v. Shultz, 86 Idaho 531, 388 P.2d 1002 (1964); Fedun v. Mike's Cafe, Inc.,
204 Pa. Super. 356, 204 A.2d 776 (1964), arf'd, 419 Pa. 607, 213 A.2d 638 (1965); Aubrey
v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389 (rex. Civ. App. 1964).
179. See 384 S.W.2d at 393-95.
180. Cf. Prevas v. Gottlieb, 229 Md. 188, 182 A.2d 489 (1962. In the rescission cases
there exists a real possibility that promissory estoppel will serve as a vehicle for carring
consideration rules over to the problems of discharge of contracts, an area where the rele-
vance of consideration doctrine has long been in doubt.
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that a party who seeks to keep a contract alive, even though in a mod-
ified form, is in a better position to secure relief than one who asks for
a full release from the burdens of performance.
181
IV. The Impact of the Estoppel Principle
In addition to resisting pressures exerted by bargain concepts, Sec-
tion 90 must also be extricated from the influence of traditional es-
toppel doctrine if it is to establish an identify of its own. The limiting
effects of the estoppel principle stem from an historical distinction
which has little real meaning today. The common definition of estoppel
in pais, or equitable estoppel'18 2 is based upon the assumption that a
promise as to the future is normally distinguishable from a factual
representation about the past or present. But because many of the
estoppel cases can be interpreted to involve an express or implied
promise rather than a representation of fact, 13 the narrow definition
of equitable estoppel has never adequately covered all the cases to
which the estoppel principle might fairly be applied. It was therefore
inevitable that a rule of promissory estoppel would develop in recog-
nition of the applicability of the estoppel principle to promises. The
basic difficulty with this innovation is that the underlying theory of
estoppel is not mechanically suited for application to promises. To
"estop" the maker of a statement of fact by sealing his mouth in court
has the effect of establishing a factual basis for an action, which, stand-
ing alone, will support recovery. 8 4 The consequences of misleading
conduct supply the injury, and the estoppel theory renders the rep-
resentor powerless to dispute the facts upon which liability is based.
The situation becomes more complex when estoppel is applied to a
promise. In the first place, enforcement goes beyond a represented
status quo.'8 5 As to theory, the mechanics of promissory estoppel pro-
181. If such considerations are entitled to weight, it is clear that the modern require-
ments of Section 90 can be shaped to effect the desired result.
182. The species of estoppel which equity puts upon a person who has made a false
representation or a concealment of material facts, with knowledge of the facts, to a
party ignorant of the truth of the matter, with the intention that the other party
should act upon it, and with the result that such party is actually induced to act
upon it to his damage.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 632 (4th ed. 1951). A good discussion of the rules of equitable
estoppel appears in Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965).
183. E.g., Hetchler v. American Life Ins. Co., 266 Mich. 608, 254 N.V. 221 (1934).
184. See American Nat'l Bank v. A.G. Somerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923);
Colonial Theatrical Enterprises v. Sage, 255 Mich. 160, 237 N.W. 529 (1931).
185. If the action seeks to enforce an affirmative undertaking by the promisor, simply
sealing the promisor's mouth because of the promisee's reliance does not fulfill the 
under-
taking. See generally Comment, The Measure of Damages for Breach of a Contract Gre.
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duce liability by the technique of "estoppel to deny consideration."'8s0
In effect a promise which is unenforceable under consideration rules
is enforced by creating the impression that a form of consideration
exists.. 8 7
The significant point is that while the reliance principle of Section
90 is widely understood as independent of the common definition of
estoppel, the technicalities which derive from the common definition
continue to influence the application of promissory estoppel.1's De-
cision after decision disposes of Section 90 in the language of equitable
estoppel, as if there were no real difference between the theories. 80
Estoppel precedents are used to give content to the specific elements of
Section 90, as well as to dispose of broad issues of promissory estop-
pel. 90 The old fact-promise distinction may be employed to preclude
liability under either equitable or promissory estoppel."0' Concepts
long associated with equitable estoppel, such as deceit and fraud, are
easily incorporated as substantive elements of promissory estoppel,
with the result that the reliance element of Section 90 is scrutinized
under such labels as "irreparable detriment," "unjust enrichment," or
"constructive fraud.' 92 The essentially defensive tradition of equitable
ated By Action in Reliance, 48 YALE L.J. 1036, 1044-45 (1939); Note. 30 TE AS L REv. 903
(1952). Cf. Griswold v. Haven, 25 N.Y. 595 (1862).
186. This is the popular description of the job performed by promissory estoppel. The
defendant is simply "estopped to deny liability by showing lack of consideration." Glitsos
v. Kadish, 4 Ariz. App. 134, 418 P.2d 129, 130 (1966).
187. In conventional language, estoppel to deny consideration provides a "substitute"
for consideration. As a practical matter, it is estoppel theory which supplies the legal
framework for the imposition of liability. f. Bray v. Gardner, 268 F. Supp. 328, 332
(E.D. Tenn. 1967): " ... in the absence of statute, the doctrine of estoppel is available
to protect a right; never to create one."
188. The wide use of the popular phrase "promissory estoppel" undoubtedly contrib-
utes to the belief that Section 90 is properly classified under an estoppel heading. As a
result, attention is diverted from the reliance principle which underlies Section 90.
189. E.g., Veasey v. Layton, 42 Del. Ch. 155, 206 A.2d 505 (1964); Edwards v. Smith.
322 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1959).
190. See Petty v. Gindy Alfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965); Ahnapee &
Western Ry. v. Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 148 NAV.2d 646 (1967).
191. See Southeastern Sales & Serv. Co. v. T.T. Watson. Inc.. 172 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1965); Croce v. Whiting Milk Co., - R.I. - , 228 A.2d 574 (1967).
192. The Illinois courts, for example, continue to require proof of fraud or intent to
deceive before there can be a recovery under Section 90. See Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. K-Way
Associates, 588 F.2d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 1968). Cf. Swift v. Peterson, 240 Iowa 715, 719, 37
N.W.2d 258, 259 (1949) ("actual fraud in the making of the promise must appear"). One
of the strongest statements of the elements of promissory estoppel appears in Meredith v.
John Deere Plow Co., 261 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir. 1958): "Such injustice must be so sub.
stantial . . . as to constitute serious prejudice (not mere legal detriment . . .), or to
amount in its effect to constructive fraud or unjust enrichment within traditional equi-
table concepts." See also Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir. 1941); McCrillis v. American Heel Co., 85 N.H. 165, 155 A. 410 (1931). It has been
recognized that an action for fraud or deceit is the "most comparable" to a Section 90
action. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267, 273 (195).
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estoppel not only dominates the fashioning of remedial relief under
Section 90,193 but, by necessary implication, brings in question the
expansion of promissory estoppel as an affirmative basis of responsi-
bility. The most striking consequence of preoccupation with estoppel
concepts is that the courts fail to recognize that application of Section
90 does in fact involve a contract. It should be recalled that the ex-
panded use of promissory estoppel in the forward-looking case of
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., was expressly premised upon a find-
ing that Section 90 did not rest upon, nor was equivalent to, a con-
tract. 9 4 Other courts have similarly dissociated promissory estoppel
from contract. 195 If such decisions are merely saying that Section 90
does not depend upon bargain consideration, the distinction is of
course accurate. But there is a general failure to recognize that Section
90 is catalogued under the heading of informal contracts without con-
sideration. As a result, attention is diverted from the specific language
of the section, which says that a "promise" is "binding" when detri-
mental reliance creates "injustice" which can be avoided only by
"enforcement of the promise."'196
The consequences of failure to recognize promissory estoppel as a
contract doctrine are felt principally in the area of remedies. After
scholarly and exhaustive analysis, the issue of whether damages awarded
under Section 90 should be limited to protection of the reliance in-
terest, or measured by the full expectation interest, is still unsettled.191
In practice, even the most progressive expansions of Section 90 often
cling to a damage measure derived from the defensive theory of
estoppel. 198 There are occasions, to be sure, where the limitations of
estoppel theory are circumvented by employing Section 90 to effect a
recovery in excess of reliance losses. 199 It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that the cases which use Section 90 as the ground for awarding
193. See note 198 infra.
194. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). See p. 359 & notes 78-80 supra.
195. E.g., Solway Decorating Co. v. Merando, Inc., 240 A.2d 361, 362-63 (D.C. Ct. App.
1968); L.S. Good & Co. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 925, 927 (N.D.W. Va. 1968)
196. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
197. The definitive work is Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam-
ages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936, 1937). See also Seavy, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises
and Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951); Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New
Writ? 35 MICH. L. REv. 908 (1937); Comment, The Measure of Damages For Breach of a
Contract Created by Action in Reliance, 48 YALE L.J. 1036 (1939); Note, 59 DICK. L. REV.
163 (1955); Note, 65 MICH. L. REV. 351 (1966); Note, 13 VAND. L. REV. 705 (1960).
198. See, e.g., Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. K-Way Associates, 388 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1968)
(dissent); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 138 N.W.2d 267 (1965);
Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965). Recoveries in the franchise dealer cases
are consistent with measuring protection by the reliance interest.
199. See, e.g., Haveg Corp. v. Guyer, - Del. -, 226 A.2d 231 (1967).
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the promised performance typically involve bargain transactions in
which consideration might arguably have been found.200 This suggests
that identification with contract doctrine is indeed essential if promis-
sory estoppel is to be broadly accepted as a vehicle for protecting the
expectation interest. To the extant that estoppel intervenes to obscure
the contract theory, the reimbursement of reliance losses alone will
likely develop as the standard damage measure under Section 90.
A further influence upon Section 90 is to be observed in the tradition
of equity which underlies estoppel. The specific concern of Section
90 with "injustice," standing alone, contemplates broad judicial dis-
cretion to make use of equitable principles. The risk inherent in such
discretion is that equities arising from sources other than Section 90
may operate to modify the requirements of that Section. For example,
the historical tests of a remedy in equity do not necessarily determine
the availability of promissory estoppel.201 Nor does Section 90 author-
ize a conventional "balancing of the equities,"202 especially in the light
of the principal concern of the section for the effects of non-perfor-
mance upon the promisee.20 3 If the particular remedy sought sounds in
equity, the elements of promissory estoppel have on occasion drawn
meaning from doctrines indigenous to the ethics of equity.
20
Since promissory estoppel is a peculiarly equitable doctrine de-
200. The courts which invoke Section 90 to support a recovery in the setting of con-
struction industry bidding are, of course, compensating for the loss of expected profits.
See, e.g., Solway Decorating Co. v. Merando, Inc., 240 A.2d 361 (D.C. DisL CL App. 1963);
Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, 374 S.W.2d 818 (1964); Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958). As has been noted, these decisions do
involve offers and take the form of conventional bargains. As to full or partial protec-
tion of the expectation interest in other settings of exchange, see Glitsos v. Kadish, 4
Ariz. App. 134, 418 P.2d 129 (1966); Associated Creditors' Agency v. Hale), Land Co., 239
Cal. App. 2d 610, 49 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966); City of Los Angeles v. Anchor Cas. Co.. 204 Cal.
App. 2d 125, 22 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1962); Anthony v. Hilo Elec. Light Co.. - Hawaii - ,
442 P.2d 64 (1968); Quijada v. Southern Pipe & Casing Co., 78 Nev. .71, 371 P.2d 661(1962); East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, - R.I. -. 239 A.2d 725 (1968);
Dyer v. Metallic Bldg. Co., 410 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Central Heat, Inc. v.
The Daily Olympian, - Wash. 2d - , 443 P.2d 544 (1963). The element of bargain is
arguably present in some of the employment compensation cases which award expecta-
tion damages on the authority of Section 90. E.g., Van Hook v. Waiters Alliance Local 17.
158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 323 P.2d 212 (1958).
201. See Dobbs v. Russell, 347 SAV.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (promissory estoppel
is inapplicable where grounds for an action in equity do not exist).
202. Viewing promissory estoppel as a "doctrine of equity," the court in Union Tank
Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 104, 387 P.2d 1000. 1003 (1964). diussed the
case entirely in terms of "the equities between the parties."
203. Professor Williston, in discussing Section 90, commented: "I suppose that the fair
inference is that it [injustice] does mean injustice to the promisee .... " 4 ALI PocEEx -
iNos 85 (Appendix 1929). Nevertheless, the foreseeability test of Section 90 operates to
safeguard promisors from reliance claims.
204. For example, the requirement of "clean hands" in quiet title action may have
determined the disposition of the issue of promissory estoppel in Weiner v. Romley. 94
Ariz. 40, 381 P.2d 581 (1962).
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signed to deal with situations which, in total impact, necessarily call
into play discretionary powers, it is desirable that the elements of
Section 90 remain sufficiently pliable. They should not, however, be
subject to unlimited modification in the name of estoppel or equity.
If it is remembered that the rules of promissory estoppel create a
contract grounded on the effects of reliance, indiscriminate use of es-
toppel notions will be minimized. The complicating factor is that the
element of detrimental reliance is essential to both estoppel and Sec-
tion 90. If Section 90 is to be unravelled from the estoppel tradition,
controlling importance must be given the specific tests of that section
in weighing the factors which bear on relief.
V. The Collision of Promissory Estoppel and Legislative Policies
Some estimate of the importance attached by courts to the principles
of promissory estoppel can be gathered from cases in which the reliance
doctrine is invoked to keep alive agreements which are unenforceable
under either statutes of limitation or the Statute of Frauds. With re-
spect to the operation of statutes of limitation, straight estoppel theory
has long provided relief in cases involving misleading conduct which
encourages the belief that protection of the statute will not be
claimed. 205 While it is not unusual for a court to find the elements of
promissory estoppel as well in such cases, 200 recent decisions suggest
that Section 90 operates only as an adjunct to general estoppel notions
in extending time limits on the bringing of actions.207 Its chief func-
tion is apparently to reinforce the considerations of injustice balanced
by the court against the purposes of the statute in deciding whether
the limitation period shall be extended in a given case.
208
When it comes to satisfying or avoiding the Statute of Frauds, courts
are unquestionably concerned about conflict between legislative policy
and the implications of Section 90. Some of the resistance to applica-
tion of reliance doctrine derives from the great extent to which the
courts understand the Statute of Frauds' requirement of a writing as
diminishing the relevance of traditional issues of enforceability.2011
205. See generally Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitations, 34 Micit. L. REV. 1
(1955). The cases are collected in IA CoRBIN § 194.
206. E.g., Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806 (1949).
207. E.g., Dobbs v. Russell, 347 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
208. See Shinabarger v. United Aircraft Corp., 381 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1967).
209. A case commonly regarded as supplying a benchmark for promissory estoppel,
Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882), illustrates the point. The court there enforced a gift
promise of a deed on the authority of the equity doctrine of "part performance." The
380
Vol. 78: 343, 1969
Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine
Even though reliance in theory works an exception to the Statute, the
consequences of non-compliance with the writing requirement tend to
carry the greatest weight. As a practical matter, the priority of the
writing requirement seems to result in more restricted application of
Section 90 than would normally be the case in other settings.210
With minor exceptions, the recent cases pitting promissory estoppel
against the defense of the Statute of Frauds involve bargains, not
gratuitous promises. They arise from attempts to create original con-
tract obligations rather than from revisions of existing relationships.
Above all, there is seldom any indication that the court is not convinced
that the oral contract was in fact made. Given these factors, it is not
surprising that the elements of promissory estoppel tend to be applied
in the language of the tests of bargain consideration.211 There is also
some tendency in the Statute of Frauds cases to lump promissory with
equitable estoppel, with some courts apparently taking the position that
only equitable estoppel will preclude the raising of the Statute.212 Be-
cause doctrines based on estoppel or fraud are so often applicable to
cases falling within Section 90, it is not unusual to find a court em-
ploying multiple theories simultaneously in a single case.213
But the most instructive cases from the standpoint of judicial at-
titudes toward promissory estoppel are those which deny any basis
whatsoever for operation of the doctrine in opposition to the Statute
of Frauds.214 Aside from explicit concern with the undermining of
legislative policy, these decisions surely reflect some lingering doubts
promise was both oral and without consideration, yet the subject of consideration was
only relevant to the court's discussion to the extent that it reinforced Use "part perfor-
mance" ground for circumventing the writing requirement. "The expenditure in mnone)
or labor in the improvement of the land induced by the donor's promise to give the land
to the party making the expenditure, constitutes, in equity, a consideration for the pro-
mise, and the promise will be enforced." Id. 394.
210. Since it is established doctrine that the Statute of Frauds is to be "strictly ap-
plied," it would seem to follow that the elements of Section 90 will also be "strictly
applied," in this context. A good collection of cases on estoppel to plead the Statute of
Frauds appears in 37 CALF. L. Riv. 151 (1949).
211. For example, in Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389, 393-91 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964), the court states that in order for a promise to defeat the defense of the statute.
the promisor must "receive some requested benefit .... "
212. E.g., Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 31 Ill. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (19I). Most
courts seem to make no distinction between the efficacy of the two theories. See Dooley v.
Lachut, - R.I - , 234 A.2d 366 (1957); Heysnan v. Adeack Realty Co.. - R.I. -,
228 A.2d 578 (1967).
213. In at least one instance, the merits of the litigation were disposed of on the
ground of promissory estoppel, while the issue of the Statute of Frauds was resolved by
a straight estoppel theory. Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App.
2d 610, 49 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966).
214. E.g., Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 I1. App. 2d 10. 195 N.E.2d 250 (19M-);
Prevas v. Gottlieb, 229 Md. 188, 182 A.2d 489 (1962).
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about the general legitimacy of the reliance ground of enforcement of
promises. Whether or not these courts are persuaded that legislative
distrust of oral agreements is expressed so conclusively that no room
for exceptions is permitted, the fact remains that dispensing powers
have historically been exercised in the face of such statutes because of
a promisee's reliance. 15 Judicial reluctance to recognize Section 90 as
falling within traditional discretionary powers suggests that for some
judges, at least, reliance is somehow less worthy of protection when it
is invoked under the theory of promissory estoppel. For example, courts
inclined to make an exception to the Statute for detrimental reliance
occasioned by deliberate misleading have indicated a different result
where the injury from a simple promise to waive the defense of the
Statute.216 The Florida Supreme Court has gone so far as to state that
only the legislature may authorize enforcement, under Section 90,
where a promise is otherwise within the Statute of Frauds. 217 These
attitudes may simply reflect the belief that, absent conduct approach-
ing willful concealment or misrepresentation, reliance upon an oral,
unenforceable promise cannot be justified.
In any case, it is important to recognize that the decisions which
close the Statute of Frauds field to Section 90 do so in the face of a
considerable body of theory which could be used to achieve the op-
posite result.21 8 It appears that the sweep of policies regarding the
215. See Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1965), for an interesting
discussion of the roles of part performance and equitable estoppel in the awarding ol
reliance damages. Jurisdictions taking a restrictive view of promissory estoppel In the
face of the Statute of Frauds, have at the same time recognized the exception to the
statute based upon the equity doctrine of part performance. See, e.g., the discussion of
authorities in Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777, 780-82 (Fla.
1966) (dissent).
216. Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 10, 17, 109 N.E.2d 250, 258
(1964); Heyman v. Adeack Realty Co., - R.I. -, 228 A.2d 578, 580 (1967). Cf. Dooley
v. Lachut, - R.I. - , - , 234 A.2d 366, 368 (1967).
217. In Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla.
1966), the court, after noting "the legislative prerogative of dealing with matters of this
nature," proceeded to say that "[T]hirty-three years have passed since the Restatement
... was adopted and there have been about fifteen intervening sessions of the legislature
at which the contents of Section 90 could have been incorporated into the act, yet we
know of no such effort or accomplishment."
218. Doctrines of estoppel and promissory estoppel have long precluded objections to
non-compliance with the Statute. See RESTATEMENT OF CONMACTS § 178, comment f at
234-35 (1932). The traditional limitation of the part performance doctrine to equitable
relief, (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACMs § 197 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968) continues to
limit the application of the part performance doctrine to equitable relief in actions In-
volving a transfer of interest in land) particularly specific performance, has been subject
to notable exceptions. See generally 2 CotaimN § 459. Since reliance is widely recognized as
providing a compelling substantive basis for relief, there is no reason why equity notions,
developed primarily in the land contract cases, should bar a damage remedy for breach
of oral agreements not involving the land contract provision of the statute. For recent
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hazards of perjured litigation have the effect of foreclosing inquiry
into competing policies. Thus cases which summarily dismiss promis-
sory estoppel seldom indicate concern with the seriousness of the
claimed reliance.219 By the same token, the possibility that proof of
actual agreement, and reliance thereon, may satisfy the purposes of
the Statute at least in some cases is not considered. It may well be
that, in the final analysis, the threat of jury verdicts of heroic propor-
dons, coupled with the fact that the legislature has declared a policy,
will have the effect of barring application of Section 90 regardless of
injustice in individual cases.
VI. Inherent Limitations of the Reliance Theory
The granting of relief under Section 90 depends ultimately upon
a judgment that enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice. Such a
requirement serves as a reminder that not all promisees who suffer
reliance injuries are entitled to the protections of the section. More
important, the notion that justice determines the limits of responsi-
bility means that promissory estoppel is informed by a basic test of
fairness. The doctrine thus allows courts wide latitude in redistributing
losses resulting from unfilled promises. At the same time, it must be
recognized that the very flexibility of Section 90 prevents its reduction
to a precise formula or series of tests..220 In consequence, as the fore-
authority supporting this view, see OxIcy v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.
1965); Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610. 49 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1966); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Ponsford Bros., 414 S. -2d 16, 28.31 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967). RESTATEMENT (SFCOND) oF Co.vmxAcs § 217A (Tent. Draft No. 4. 1965)
states a basic principle which recognizes the necessity of an ordinary damage action in
situations where reliance gives rise to injustice, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.
Cf. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L
REv. 440 (1931). And as noted earlier, see pp. 376-78 & notes 185-95, the separate theory
of the promise to reduce the agreement to writing, as distinguished from a promise of
performance, has hardly been explored at all. See 24 WAsH. & LrE L. Rr'. 347 (1967), for
a discussion of the problems in applying Section 90 to employment contracts within the
"'one-year" clause of the Statute of Frauds. See also Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782.
106 P. 88 (1909).
219. E.g., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 173 So. 2d 492 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1965), aff'd, 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966).
220. Many of the shortcomings of traditional analysis result from a tendency to %iew
Section 90 as establishing a series of known tests which are uniformnly applicable through-
out the field. It is customary to set out the following prerequisites 'for a recoiery under
the section: "(1) A promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the
promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his
position (4) justifiably relying on the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 70 Wash. 2d 522.
538-39, 424 P.2d 290, 300-01 (1967).
A wide variety of factors have been identified as potentially relevant to the application
of promissory estoppel. Professor Corbin goes so far as to suggest that "the relative cco-
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going discussion should have demonstrated, it is difficult if not im-
possible to abstract and describe any single theory of the operation of
the reliance principle of Section 90. Now that the role being played by
that section has been examined in some detail at each stage of the
contracting process, however, certain general observations and sugges-
tions are in order. Because the language of Section 90 appears to call
for the enforcement of the promised performance, rather than an
award of reliance losses,221 it is customary for the courts to dwell upon
the requirement that reliance be "of a definite and substantial char-
acter." The trouble with this statement is that it seems to get trans-
lated into rigid tests which suggest that some specific degree of reliance
must be shown in order to recover.2 22 If, on the other hand, limited
or partial enforcement comes to be recognized as the norm in Section
90 cases, 223 the test of substantial reliance is likely to merge with the
test of "injustice." The result will be that the extent of relief will re-
flect and be tailored to the extent of reliance, encouraging develop-
ment of a more effective working concept concentrating inquiry upon
the foreseeability and seriousness of reliance.
A party who seeks to rest liability on reliance grounds must be
prepared to carry a substantial burden of argument and proof. Prob-
lems of proof of actual loss, particularly where reliance takes the form
of forbearance, have been crucially significant in a number of instances
where recovery has been denied under the promissory estoppel label.='
nomic needs and capacities of the parties and the needs and interests of tile promisor's
dependents and creditors should be taken into consideration, particularly in determining
the form of remedy and the extent of the recovery." IA CouIN § 200. And in determln-
ing whether the reliance requirement of Section 90 is satisfied, the following factors have
been suggested as significant:
. .. the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance, . . . its definite and substantial
character in relation to the remedy sought .... the formality with which the promise
is made, . . . the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and chan-
neling functions of form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise, and . . .the
extent to which other policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention of
unjust enrichment are relevant.
RmESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 90, comment b at 16 (Tent. Draft, No. 2, 1965).
It is unrealistic to suppose that each of these many factors must command equal weight
in every instance.
221. Section 90 merely says a promise is "binding" where "enforcement" is necessary
to avoid injustice. It fails to say to what extent the promise is binding or enforceable.
222. See, e.g., Darmopray v. Bayeas, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 182 (C.P. 1957). As a result,
questions are posed as to whether reliance must involve "solely pecuniary loss" or be
"substantial in an economic sense." See Mohr v. Shultz, 86 Idaho 531, 540. 388 P.2d 1002.
1008 (1964); Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
223. See cases cited at note 198 supra. Because the Tentative Draft of Section 90 In
the Restatement (Second) adds a new sentence recognizing the possibility of partial en-
forcement, the requirement that action in reliance have "a definite and substantial
character" is abandoned. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRActs § 90, Reporter's Note
at 173-74 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
224. See Bush v. Bush, 278 Ala. 244, 177 So. 568 (1965); Weiner v. Romley, 94 Ariz.
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The handling of the mistake factor in the construction bidding cases
is representative of more general attitudes about the responsibilities a
promisee is expected to assume concerning the reasonableness of his
conduct.2 25 If damages are difficult to assess or the consequences of
reliance hard to unravel, the chances of success on a theory of promis-
sory estoppel may be impaired. 220 And even if recovery is won in the
trial court, the broad scope of judicial review permitted by promissory
estoppel increases the possibility of reversal, especially where a large
damage recovery is involved..227
In addition, the subject matter of the action may significantly in-
fluence the outcome of litigation. For example, attempts to expand
insurance coverage by resort to Section 90 are likely to founder upon
familiar rules pertaining to the limited operation of estoppel doc-
trine.22s Courts are also reluctant to use Section 90 to make a promisor
an insurer or guarantor.229 And it will be remembered that promissory
estoppel has had little success in cases involving the employment re-
40, 281 P.2d 581 (1963); Thomson v. Stage Employees, 232 Cal. App. 2d 446,42 Cal. Rptr. 785
(1965); Dewein v. Dewein's Estate, 30 111. App. 2d 446, 174 N.E.2d 875 (1961); Paul Estate.
34 Pa. D. & C.2d 765 (1963); Shaw v. George, - S.D. -, 141 N.AV.2d 405 (1965);
Overlock v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., - Vt. - , 237 A.2d 356 (1967).
225. That a plaintiff must demonstrate the exercise of reasonable care in order to re-
cover under Section 90 is well documented in the cases. For example, recovery is denied
where there is a reasonable basis for charging the promisee with notice of a possible
mistake by the promisor. E.g., Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387
P.2d 1000 (1964). Knoweldge of other terms or conditions in the full transaction can be
a decisive factor on the issue of reasonableness of reliance. See Stanley Furniture Co. v.
Texas State Bank, 425 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Perhaps the most interesting
decisions in this area are the ones which charge the promisee with unreasonableness for
failure to bind the promisor to a .contract before relying. Eg., Wheeler v. White, 398
S.V.2d 93, 96-97 (Tex. 1965). Cf. Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30
(1965).
226. In Slatter v. Geo. B. Clarke & Sons, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 814. 816 (D. Del. 1960). the
difficulties of computing damages were expressly tied to the reasonableness of the promi-
see's conduct.
227. Compare Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 70 Wash. 2d 522, 424 P.2d 290 (1967), with
Haveg Corp. v. Guyer, - Del. - , 226 A.2d 231 (1967). Cf. Van Hook v. Waiters
Alliance, Local 17, 158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 323 P.2d 212 (1958).
228. Promissory estoppel was the basis for enlarging the scope of the policy in Travel.
ers Indem. Co. v. Holman, 330 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1964). Contra, Ahnapee & Western Ry.
v. Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 148 N.W.2d 646 (1967). The question was reserved in Artmar.
Inc. v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 181, 185, 148 NAV.2d 641, 643 (1967). By the
prevailing view an insurer is not estopped, even though he knew when the policy was
issued the extent of the insured's interest, to deny that the insured had a sufficient
insurable interest.
229. E.g., Dillown v. Phaen, 106 Ohio App. 106, 153 N.E.2d 687 (1957); Stanley Furni-
ture Co. v. Texas State Bank, 425 SAV.2d 883 (rex. Civ. App. 1968); Nichols v. Acers Co..
415 S.A.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). Occasionally, however, promises to procure insur-
ance have been fully enforced on the theory of Section 90. Graddon v. Knight, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 577, 292 P.2d 632 (1956); East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia. - R.l.
- , 239 A.2d 725 (1968). Cf. RESTATEIMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 90. Comment f at
172-73 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965). At the very least, the elements of Section 90 are apt
to be closely scrutinized where liability is large in relation to the value of the promised
service. See Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965).
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lation and franchised dealers-areas marked by longstanding con-
fusion in the theory of consideration. If, on the other hand, action in
reliance is taken by a third person who is a beneficiary of the promise,
there appears to be support developing for application of the theory
of Section 90,230 although at least one court has been reluctant to accept
reliance by the promisee as a basis for reinforcing the claim of a bene-
ficiary who was seriously prejudiced by the reliance.231
Possibly the greatest risk in electing to proceed on a theory of prom-
issory estoppel is that the concept of reliance, and hence injustice, Will
be tested by the criteria of common law consideration. In view of the
frequency with which Section 90 is raised today in the context of com-
mercial exchange, it should not be surprising that principles of bargain
reliance became confused with the requirements of promissory estop-
pel.2 32 The chief difficulty with this tendency is that if the reliance
element of Section 90 is reduced to common law notions of "legal
detriment," any real assessment of the merits of the alleged action in
reliance is unlikely to occur.233 One court has even gone so far as to
suggest that, for purposes of Section 90, forbearance is not prejudicial
unless it consists of "an abandonment or deferment of an enforceable
right.' 234 This insistence upon the classic terminology of consideration
is symptomatic of a general desire to give familiar meaning to the
elements of Section 90. But it woodenly directs attention away from
considerations of justice and the extent of reliance, and focuses in-
stead upon relatively inflexible and narrow bargain-oriented rules. As
has been pointed out above, since the typical commercial case in which
Section 90 is invoked will satisfy some of the elements of both theories,
230. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), extends
the protections of Section 90 to claims of third party beneficiaries. RESrATMNT (SECoND)
OF CONTACTs § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965), expressly includes "a third person" within
the operation of the reliance principle. Cf. Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 428
P.2d 524 (1967).
231. Overlock v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 126 Vt. 549, 237 A.2d 356 (1967). A
contrary position is taken in R=sTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRArs § 90, comment d at
169 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
232. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Anchor Cas. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 175, 22 Cal. Rptr.
278 (1962); Dyer v. Metallic Bldg. Co., 410 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
233. As suggested earlier, the confusion of price or bargain with the principle of In.
justice underlying Section 90 tends to distort the reliance concept. The fact of actual
inducement wanes in significance. See, e.g., Fedun v. Mike's Cafe, Inc., 201 Pa. Super. 856,
204 A.2d 776 (1964), af'd, 419 Pa. 607, 213 A.2d 638 (1965). Bargain notions fix guidelines
which operate to limit the areas within which reliance is permissible. See, e.g., the discus-
sion of the reliance factor in Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d ,385, 391-2, 153
N.W.2d 587, 589 (1967); Neth v. General Electric Co., 65 Wash. 2d 652, 658-60, 899 P.2d
314, 318-19 (1965).
234. Overlock v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 126 Vt. 549, 237 A.2d 356, 359 (1967).
See also Pitts v. McGraw-Edison Co., 329 F.2d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1964) (" . . . plaintiff
gave up nothing to which he was legally entitled . . . ").
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it is not surprising that bargain principles permeate judicial treatment
of the reliance factor. Nevertheless, if the principles of fairness and
avoidance of injustice underlying Section 90 are to serve their intended
function, some effort must be made to distinguish reliance from bargain
elements and to allow the former some autonomy of application.
Given the vast factual differences among the Section 90 cases, any
attempt to dispose of the problems of promissory reliance by a single
formula is hazardous because no formula can be comprehensive enough
to resolve every case satisfactorily. But the major impact of promissory
estoppel in recent years may be that it has made the whole matter of
classification or definition less important in the decision of contract
cases. Change is in fact being effected by quiet manipulation of the
familiar labels. To this extent, protection of the reliance interest ulti-
mately depends upon the total impact of a given case rather than upon
the technicalities of classification.
At this stage the principal difficulty is that the purposes to be served
by Section 90 in the setting of bargains have not been sufficiently iden-
tified or examined. If the reason for enforcing a bargain promise on a
non-bargain theory is to protect reasonable reliance in conduct, the
criteria of consideration are not of central importance. However, the
policies which underlie orthodox contract rules are quite relevant to
the expansion of Section 90 in commercial cases. No persuasive public
policy may preclude a recovery where injury is occasioned by a gratu-
itous promise. But if a reliance claim arises in the bargain context,
policy considerations relating to the security of expectations come into
play. It is probable that the next stage of development of Section 90
will evidence concern with these broader aspects of the reliance theory.
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